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BRETT W. NELSON, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action at law to recover money damages 
for the alleged alienation of his former wife's affections by 
defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried without a jury on January 21, 1981, 
before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah. Defendant was not represented by counsel 
at the time of trial. The trial court awarded judgment in plain-
tiff's favor against defendant in the total amount of $84,600, 
$25,000 of which constituted punitive damages. (A copy of the 
trial court's "Findings and Judgment," dated January 29, 1981, is 
set forth in Appendix "A" of this brief.) Defendant then retained 
his present counsel and moved the court for a new trial .and for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Both motions were denied by 
the court on March 13, 1981. (A copy of the trial court's "Order 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Denying Motion For New Trial And For Judgment Notwithstanding The 
Verdict" is set forth in Appendix "B.") Defendant objected to 
I 
the findings of fact contained in the trial court's March 13, 198, 1 
order (see Appendix "C"), but the trial court refused to sustain ! 
I 
defendant's objections and refused to modify its earlier findings 1 
'! 
with the exception of an insignificant amendment thereto, set fort· 
in Appendix "D. II Defendant's "Notice of Appeal" was filed on Apri; 
9, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the trial court on either of two 
independent grounds: ( l) the common law of the State of Utah no 
longer recognizes an action at law for the alienation of a spouse's! 
affections; or, (2) the evidence below and the trial court's fin~ 
ings of fact wholly fail to establish the fundamental elements of 
a cause of action for alleged alienation of affections. In the 
alternative, defendant seeks reversal of the trial court and re-
mand for a new trial on either of two independent grounds: (1) 
I 
defendant was denied due process of law in the pre-trial proc~ua ' 
employed by the court below; or, (2) the trial court's findings of I 
fact and conclusions of law are so inadequate as to virtually I 
preclude comprehensive appellate review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Procedural Facts. 1 
Plaintiff commenced this action on September 27, 1979. Def en· 
dant retained David P. Brown to represent him in this matter, and 
1The clerk below failed to paginate the transcript of the pr: 
ceedings as part of, the record on appeal; therefore, reference , 
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Brown filed an answer on defendant's behalf on October 26, 1979. 
' I The case was originally set for trial on March 26, 1980, but the 
latter setting was converted into a pre-trial setting pursuant to 
11 I the request of both counsel for plaintiff and counsel for defendant. 
R. 6. The March 26, 1980 pre-trial was continued pursuant to the 
1











reflect the reasons therefor, two pre-trial settings were subse-
quently vacated on May 7, 1980 and July 2, 1980. R. 9, 10. The 
record does not disclose that these settings were vacated exclu-
sively at the request or insistence of defendant. Subsequently, 
a pre-trial was scheduled for October 15, 1980. R. 10. 
The record indicates, however, that on July 29, 1980, the 
parties, through counsel, stipulated to dismissal of plaintiff's 
complaint with prejudice. R. 11. 
On September 12, 1980, defendant's attorney was granted leave 
to withdraw as counsel in this matter. R. 12. The certificates 
of mailing on Brown's Withdrawal of Counsel and Petition for Approval 
of Withdrawal of Counsel do not indicate that copies thereof were 
mailed to defendant. See R. 12-13. Plaintiff did not file with 
the court or serve on defendant notice to appoint another attorney 
or to appear in person as specifically required by Utah Code Anno-
tated (U.C.A.) §78-51-36 (1977) and by Rule 2.5 of the Rules of 
Practice in the District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah. 
R. 53. 
Thereafter, on December 26, 1980, plaintiff petitioned the 
trial court "to set aside" its July 29, 1980 order of dismissal, 
"to reinstate the action," and to set the matter for non-jury 
trial. The affidavit of plaintiff '.s counsel accompanied the 
-3-
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aforementioned petition. In his affidavit, plaintiff's counsel 
represented to the trial court that defendant had breached the 
terms of the settlement agreement between the parties, upon which 
the earlier stipulation and order of dismissal were based. Plain-
tiff scheduled a hearing on his petition for January 7, 1981 and 
mailed notice thereof to defendant on December 26, 1980. No noticel 
to appoint another attorney or appear in person was filed or servec 
with plaintiff's petition and notice.
2 
On January 7, 1981, plaintiff's petition to set aside and~ 
reinstate was apparently granted by Judge Tibbs. At the time of 
the January 7 hearing, defendant was present in the courtroom, 
although plaintiff's counsel was temporarily absent. R. 83; Tr.(, 
The following is the complete transcript of the trial court's 
"hearing" on plaintiff's petition: 
THE COURT: We are now on Civil 7928, Nelson vs. 
Jacobsen. Is Mr. Mciff here? 
THE CLERK: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to set this case for hearing 
on January 21st at 10:00 A.M., following the law and 
motion matters. You notify Mr. Mciff accordingly. 
THE CLERK: I will. 
Tr. 4 (emphasis added). 
2
Defendant's former counsel received notice of plaintiff's 
petition to set aside the stipulation and order of dismissal. ~ 
his letter informing Judge Tibbs that he would not be present at 
the hearing thereon, Brown wrote: 
It seems to me that the counsel for the plain-
tiff needs to give the defendant an opportunity 
to acquire new counsel before any further hear-
ings are had in this matter. 
See letter, dated January 6, 1981, from David P. Brown to Judge , 
Don V. Tibbs (emphasis added). (The original of this letter is 
in the record on a~peal, but was not paginated by the clerk be]o·,; 
-4-
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--
Defendant left the courtroom immediately after the lower court 
set the matter "for hearing." R. 82. Approximately 20 minutes 
thereafter, counsel for plaintiff appeared in court and inquired 
whether the case had been set. The court informed counsel of the 
date and time of the setting and told the clerk to notify defendant 
of "this hearing." Tr. 4 (emphasis added), see also, R. 20 (the 
clerk's minute entry of January 7, 1981 clearly states: "this 
matter is set for hearing") (emphasis added). On January 14, 1981, 
the lower court executed an order "reinstating" the case. The 
January 14 order also contained a notice of trial setting. The 
order and notice were not filed with the clerk until Friday, Janu-
ary 16, 1981. R. 25. It is undisputed that defendant received 
the notice of trial setting on Monday, January 19, 1981, R. 84, and 
that it was on this date defendant was first notified that a trial 
of this matter was scheduled for January 21, 1981. R. 84. Defen-
dant was required to prepare his case for trial upon two days 
notice. Defendant appeared pro se at the January 21 trial. The 
record does not disclose that defendant was advised of his right 
to a jury trial, nor does it disr.lose that defendant was advised 
of any rights he may have had to request a continuance. 
Trial of this matter commenced at 2:00 p.m. on January 21, 
1981. Prior to plaintiff's opening statement, the following 
interchange between the lower court and defendant occurred: 
THE COURT: The matter before the Court is 7928, 
Brett w. Nelson, Plaintiff, vs. Jeff Jacobsen, Defendant. 
Are you ready to proceed? 
MR. McIFF: The Plaintiff is ready, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jacobsen? 
MR. JACOBSEN: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you represented by any attorney, 
Mr. Jacobsen? 
-5-
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MR. JACOBSEN: No, Your Honor. I'd like to offer a 
brief explanation of my apology for that. I had an 
attorney and since my funds were depleted, I sold every-
thing I owned trying to retain this attorney and subse-
quently I couldn't pay any more for an attorney over the 
years this has gone on and so I was unable to acquire 
legal counsel because of financial difficulties, so I 
spoke to Mr. Brown, the Prosecuting Attorney of Sanpete 
County, and he went over everything with me and advised 
me that because of my financial situation, I'd better 
defend myself, so I'm prepared to do that. 
THE COURT: You understand, of course, that it's 
the Court's obligation to hear the evidence and make a 
ruling based upon the evidence and be fair to both 
parties under the law, do you understand that? 
MR. JACOBSEN: Yes, I do, Your Honor. I hope you'll 
bear with me in the fact that I'm not versed in any Court 
procedures or anything like that but 
THE COURT: You have a right to represent yourself 
and likewise I have to rule and make certain rulings that 
you might not understand. 
MR. JACOBSEN: I understand. The terminology and 
everyth.ing will probably be --
THE COURT: Alright, are you prepared to go forward, 
Mr. Jacobsen? 
MR. JACOBSEN: Yes, I am. 
Tr. 6-7. 
The trial, of course, resulted in judgment against defendant 
in the amount of $84,600.00. 
In his affidavits in support of his motion for a new trial, 
defendant explained in detail the circumstances surrounding his 
termination of his former counsel, Mr. David P. Brown, of Salt 
Lake City. (Copies of said affidavits are set forth in Appendice: 
"E" and "F.") Mr. Brown asked for and received from defendant a 
retainer totaling $7, 000. 00. Brown specifically represented to 
defendant that $6,500.00 would be held in a "trust fund .. ·to 
negotiate a settlement with Mr. Nelso.n's attorney, pay any addi· 
tional attorney's f~es that were incurred, and refund the baLl~ 
to" defendant. R. 51-52. 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~1 
I 
In approxi~ately August of 1980, Brown informed defendant 
that settlement with plaintiff had been negotiated in the amount 
of $5,000.00 and that defendant should forward said amount to his 
office. R. 52. Defendant instructed Brown to pay the settlement 
amount out of that part of defendant's retainer which Brown held 
"in trust." Brown replied that the entire retainer had been applied 
as payment for the legal services he had rendered defendant to that 
date. R. 52. 
Upon defendant's protest, Brown stated that if defendant 
discharged him, he would refund $1,300.00 to defendant. R. 52. 
Defendant discharged Brown, but specifically requested that Brown 
send him copies of all the documents and material contained in 
defendant's file. Brown failed to deliver both the requested 
copies and/or the file itself and refused to instruct defendant 
concerning the procedure the court would likely follow subsequent 
to his withdrawal as defendant's counsel. R. 52. As noted above, 
Brown withdrew as defendant's counsel, with court approval, on 
September 12, 1980. R. 12. Copies of neither Brown's Withdrawal 
as Counsel nor his Petition for Approval of Withdrawal of Counsel 
were mailed to defendant, and plaintiff, as noted above, failed to 
file with the court or serve upon defendant notice to appoint 
another attorney or to appear in person. 
The primary thrust of defendant's motion for a new trial was 
that he had been denied due process of law because he had not re-
ceived adequate and timely notice of trial, and as a result, he had 
not been afforded a reasonable and fair opportunity to present his 
defense in a meaningful way. R. 31, 35-43. The lower court denied 
defendant's motion and made various findings of fact, ~~~Appendix 
"B," to which defendant vigorously and extensively objected. See 
-7-
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Appendix "C." Of particular importance was the lower court's 
failure to find as fact the date upon which defendant received 
actual notice of the trial setting and its failure to find that 
plaintiff failed to give the statutory notice required by U.C.A. 
§78-51-36 (1977) and Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice in the 
District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah. 
B. Substantive Facts. 
From January to October of 1979, the time period in issue in 
this litigation, plaintiff was married to Brenda Lee Nelson. 
Plaintiff commenced this action on September 27, 1979. It is un-
disputed that plaintiff and Brenda Nelson were divorced subsequent i 
I 
to the filing of this action, although the record below does n~ I 
indicate the exact date upon which the decree became final. Defen-1 
dant requests this Court to take judicial notice of the fact that 
the divorce between plaintiff and Brenda became final on Febrwry 
1, 1980. {See footnote 4; a copy of said divorce decree is set 
forth in Appendix "G.") 
It is also undisputed that at the time of 
Brenda Nelson Jacobsen were husband and wife. 
at trial that his relationship with Brenda did 
or mature into marriage until "several months" 
trial, defendant ani/ 
Defendant testifiea I 
i 
not become romantic! 
after plaintiff~/ 
I 
Brenda were divorced. Tr. 79. No evidence was introduced bel~ 
with respect to the specific date upon which defendant and Bnn~ ' 
I 
were married. Defendant requests this Court to take judicial I 
notice of the fact that defendant and Brenda Nelson Jacobsen ftR I 
married on October 1, 1980. (See footnote 4; a copy of the roarri· 1 
age certificate of defendant and Brenda Nelson Jacobsen is set 
I 
forth in Appendix "H.") 
-8-
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Plaintiff testified at trial that he first became acquainted 
with defendant in approximately January of 1979. Tr. 18. It is 
undisputed that plaintiff, Brenda and defendant became friends at 
the time of their initial acquaintance and that plaintiff and 
Brenda occasionally invited defendant into their home. Tr. 19, 32, 
94, 104. Moreover, defendant testified that plaintiff and Brenda 
occasionally visited him at his home in Axtell, Utah. Tr. 70. 
Plaintiff did not testify to the contrary. 
From January to June of 1979, plaintiff, Brenda and defendant 
had extensive contacts. (See below.) Plaintiff testified that in 
June of 1979 he became aware that defendant was "seeing" his wife. 
Tr. 19. The bulk of plaintiff's evidence at trial concerned the 
conduct and contacts between the parties and Brenda from June to 
October of 1979. 
In the context of alienation of affections litigation, the 
conduct of at least three persons is always relevant: (1) plaintiff; 
(2) defendant; and, (3) the allegedly alienated spouse. This case 
is no exception. Plaintiff introduced evidence at trial with 
respect to his own conduct, and the conduct of both defendant and 
Brenda. For purposes of convenience and analysis, therefore, the 
conduct of each of the three principals must be analyzed as it 
bears upon the ultimate issue in this case, i.e., whether defendant 
"wilfully and intentionally" alienated Brenda's affections for 
plaintiff. See, Wilson vs. Oldroyd, l Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 
763 (1954). 
1. Plaintiff Brett Nelson 
Plaintiff's only testimony at trial regarding the nature of 
his "affection" for Brenda was as follows: 
Q: Were you divorced in this Court s~metime 
during the latter part of that year, in 1979? 
-9-
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A: Yes. 
Q: After the divorce, did you have contact 
with her? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: Did you still feel affection for her? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: Did you express that affection to her? 
A: Yes. 
Q: On one occasion or many occasions? 
A: Many occasions. 
* * * 
Q: Throughout the whole course of the problems 
once you discovered it existed to the end of 
that year, was there any time when you did not 
feel affection for your wife, and wanted her, 
and wanted to make that marriage work? 
A: Pardon? 
Q: Beginning with June, when you first became 
aware of the problem to the end of the year of 
1979, did you feel affection for her that 
whole time and wanted, if possible, to make 
that marriage work? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Tr. 29-30. Plaintiff offered no further specifics regarding the 
nature or quality of his affections for Brenda prior to their 
divorce. 
Significant evidence was presented at trial regarding state-
ments and conduct by plaintiff which clearly indicated his lacko'. 
affection for Brenda. For example, on those occasions when plaint::l 
I 
became upset with Brenda, he frequently called plaintiff's father 1 
"to come and get her." Tr. 44. On one occasion, after having 
become upset with Brenda, plaintiff "pushed (her] around" and toi" 
her to "get out" of their home and leave. Tr. 96. A friend of 
plaintiff and Brend~, Linda Springer, testified that she was a~~ 
that plaintiff and Brenda had problems in their marriage before 
-10-
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I 
they became acguainted with defendant. Tr. 91. In fact, Brenda 
testified that in August or September of 1978, a few months after 
they were married and long before they became acquainted with 
defendant, plaintiff told Brenda that he wanted a divorce from 
her. Tr. 105. Finally, Brenda testified that on the evening 
plaintiff was fired from his job as a truck driver, plaintiff came 
home "screaming" and threatened to beat her. Tr. 108. As to what 
next transpired, Brenda testified as follows: 
I came out [of the bedroom] and asked him what 
was wrong, and he was sitting there, throwing 
the knife in the floor and I said, "What are 
you doing with the knife," and he just says, 
"Well, I just hate you, you so and so, and you 
better call your dad and have him come and get 
you," and then I went to call and he grabbed 
the phone and he said, "never mind. I'll call 
him," so he called him. 
Tr. 108 (emphasis added). 
Regarding the nature of plaintiff's affections for Brenda, 
Linda Springer testified as follows: 
Q: And isn't it true that he had a great amount 
of affection towards his wife and it was extremely 
difficult for him to adjust to the fact that he 
was losing her? 
A: I don't think that's a fair statement or 
question to be asking. 
Q: Let me break it down: 
It is true, is it not, that he was extremely 
distraught and uptight concerning that he was 
losing his wife? 
A: In ways, yes; other ways, no, he wasn't. He 
would act like he was concerned but every time 
that they were together, which I was with them 
many a time, he would always bring the subject 
up and there might have been a problem, bu~ he 
wouldn't let it die. He had to keep needling at 
it. 
Tr. 90 (emphasis added). 
In short, defendant presented substantial evidence that the 
marital affections between plaintiff and Brenda substantially 
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deteriorated prior to and during the time period at issue in this 
litigation. Plaintiff failed to introduce any rebuttal testimony 
1 
to refute the evidence presented by defendant in this regard. 
The trial court failed to expressly find as fact whether or 
not plaintiff and Brenda enjoyed any reciprocal marital affections 
prior to or during the time period at issue in this case. The 
trial court's only finding of fact which contains the word "af~~ 
tion" is finding of fact #2, which recites that defendant "did 
alienate the affection of Brenda Nelson for her husband, Brett 
Nelson." R. 27. The trial court failed to make any other expr~s 
or specific findings of supporting or subsidiary facts with respect 
to th~ presence or absence of reciprocal affections in the marriage I 
of plaintiff and Brenda. 
Substantial evidence was introduced at trial that plaintiff 
had a serious alcohol problem during the course of his marriage ~ i 
Brenda and frequently battered and abused her. Substantial evidenc! 
was also introduced that plaintiff's history of alcohol abuse a~ 
battery of his wife were the primary causes of the alienation of 1 
I 
any affection Brenda may have had for him. Linda Springer testifieil 
that, although plaintiff may have perceived defendant as the "probld 
in the marriage," nevertheless, "drinking and violence was the 
main thing that made Brenda keep leaving him • Tr. 93. 
Linda Springer also testified that plaintiff's "drinking problem' 
was common knowledge and was the primary cause of physical con-
frontations between plaintiff and Brenda, which occasionally re-
sulted in physical injuries to either or both of them. Tr. 91° 
Springer testified further that on the night plaintiff was 
terminated from his trucking job, she was at the Nelson home when 
he came home at approximately 3: 00 or 4: 00 a.m. Tr. 85. Plaintif 
was drunk, and upon his arrival he began yelling. Tr. 86. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
With respect to this incident, plaintiff testified that he 
caught defendant and Brenda "standing over there talking," and as 
a result, grabbed her by the arm and took her around to the front 
of his pickup to ask her "what was going on." Tr. 34. After 
Brenda's explanation that she and defendant "were only talking," 
plaintiff told Brenda that they were going home. Plaintiff testi-
fied that defendant then struck him, knocked him down, and eventually 
kicked him in the face. No rebuttal testimony was introduced re-
garding Brenda's testimony that plaintiff physically assaulted her 
and abused her that evening. 
Finally, Brenda testified with respect to a serious alter-
cation between herself and plaintiff, after which she left her home 
and went to defendant's home. (Although defendant was uncertain 
with respect to the date of this incident, he testified that it 
took place in approximately September of 1979. Tr. 78.t Although 
Brenda did not specifically testify as to causes of the altercation, 
she did testify that plaintiff was drunk, and she, defendant and 
her father all testified concerning the physical injuries she 
sustained as a result of this altercation with plaintiff. Tr. 99. 
Brenda testified: 
Tr. 100. 
I had bruises on my arms from him grabbing me, 
I had bruises on my back from him pushing me 
against the wall. I had knots on my head from 
being slammed against the wall. I had rug 
burns on my legs while he was kicking, while 
I was on the floor and my fingers were swollen 
from him hitting me with his cast. 
Defendant testified as follows regarding Brenda's injuries 
on this occasion: 
She was bleeding from the corner of the mouth, 
her face was bruised, she ~as bruised all up 
the arms·, the back of her head was just a 
series of knots, she had red puffy marks all 
over her hands, and her hands were totally 
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Plaintiff's history of alcohol abuse was inextricably inter-
woven with his consistent battery and physical abuse of Brenda. 
In addition to the knife incident referred to above, Brenda testi-
fied at trial regarding three specific occasions upon each of whi~ 
she was physically abused by plaintiff. First, Brenda testified 
that plaintiff got drunk and physically abused her on an Easter 
outing in 1979. R. 94. Apparently, plaintiff, Brenda, defendant 
and a few of their friends "went out on the desert" for a social 
and recreational outing during the Easter holiday. After defendant 
returned home, and after plaintiff had imbibed significant amounts 
of alcohol, plaintiff and Brenda commenced arguing. As the argu-
ment ensued, plaintiff eventually pushed Brenda to the ground a~ 
"bit" her on the back, leaving red marks where plaintiff's teeth 
had broken her skin. R. 94-95. Plaintiff testified that he and 
Brenda "got along great" during the Easter outing and did not 
fight "at all." Tr. 34. 
Second, Brenda testified concerning plaintiff's abuse of her 
during a social gathering at Black Mountain in June of 1979. tr. 
95-96. Brenda testified that, during the course of the outing, she 
walked by defendant and said "hello," at which time plaintiff saw 
her. Plaintiff immediately grabbed Brenda, pulled her around in 
front of a truck, and threw her down to the ground. Tr. 96. 
Plaintiff then told Brenda that they "were going home." Tr. 96. 
Brenda replied that she was not going home with plaintiff if he wa; 
"going to act like this." Tr. 96. Thereafter, plaintiff be~n 
pushing Brenda around again and eventually threw her down a secon~ 
time. Tr. 96. Plaintiff then approached defendant and atte~t~ ' 
to throw a punch at him. Defendant eventually struck plaintiff. 
·That evening, upon 'returning home, plaintiff "physically assault; 
Brenda, pushed her around, and told her to leave the house. rr . 
........ 
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With respect to this incident, plaintiff testified that he 
caught defendant and Brenda "standing over there talking," and as 
i- a result, grabbed her by the arm and took her around to the front 
1ich of his pickup to ask her "what was going on." Tr. 34. After 
Brenda's explanation that she and defendant "were only talking," 
plaintiff told Brenda that they were going home. Plaintiff testi-
1t fied that defendant then struck him, knocked him down, and eventually 
kicked him in the face. No rebuttal testimony was introduced re-
laM garding Brenda's testimony that plaintiff physically assaulted her 
rts and abused her that evening. 
u- Finally, Brenda testified with respect to a serious alter-
nd cation between herself and plaintiff, after which she left her home 
and went to defendant's home. (Although defendant was uncertain 
with respect to the date of this incident, he testified that it 
took place in approximately September of 1979. Tr. 78.) Although 
Brenda did not specifically testify as to causes of the altercation, 
er she did testify that plaintiff was drunk, and she, defendant and 
~. her father all testified concerning the physical injuries she 
~ sustained as a result of this altercation with plaintiff. Tr. 99. 
~w Brenda testified: 
1n I had bruises on my arms from him grabbing me, 
I had bruises on my back from him pushing me 
against the wall. I had knots on my head from 
being slammed against the wall. I had rug 
6. burns on my legs while he was kicking, while 
I was on the floor and my fingers were swollen 






Defendant testified as follows regarding Brenda's injuries 
on this occasion: 
She was bleeding from the corner of the mouth, 
her face was bruised, she was bruised all up 
the arms, 'the back of her head was just a 
series of knots, she had red puffy marks all 
over her hands, and her hands were totally 
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Tr. 79. 
swollen. She had very little muscle tone on 
her fingers, and they were puffed like this 
on both hands from Brett beating her with 
a cast. • . . She could not straighten up. 
She was doubled over. 
After plaintiff beat her, Brenda left her home and eventually 
went to defendant's home. Brenda's father came to defendant's ~u 
to retrieve his daughter approximately "six hours at the most" 
after she had arrived there. Tr. 100. Brenda's father descri~d 
as follows her injuries he observed at the time he arrived at 
defendant's home: 
I can describe what I saw. She was black and 
blue from the top of her head to her toes. 
She had big knots on her hands and on her 
wrists and on her head and she had bruises on 
her wrists. She couldn't hardly--she couldn't 
bend over. She'd been worked over and her 
hands were all puffed up •••• 
Tr. 119-120. 
Plaintiff testified that this specific altercation occurnd 
in the latter part of August, 1979. Tr. 27. With respect to the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, plaintiff testified that 
he began interrogating Brenda on the evening in question concernin: 
her "sexually [sic] involvement" with defendant. Tr. 27. Plaintiff 
testified that he "asked her about that and I finally got her ~~ 
to 10 or 12 times." Tr. 27. Later that evening, plaintiff test1· 
fied that Brenda asked him to take her to defendant's house. fi, 
27. Plaintiff testified that approximately one-half hour af~r~ 
refused to take her, "she got upset and tore into me, and started 
clawing me and biting me Tr. 28. Plaintiff did concede, 
however, that he slapped Brenda with the palm of his hand and P~~ 
her away in order to defend himself and "to settle her down." ft 
46. Plaintiff spec'ifically testified that this August altercatio 
I 
was the "first and the last" time he engaged in any "physical 
-lh- • 
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viol<'nce" vis-a-vis Brenda. Tr. 47. 
So pervasive was plaintiff's alcohol problem and physical 
abuse of Brenda in their marriage that Brenda repeatedly testified 
at trial that plaintiff's conduct, not defendant's, was the cause 
of her repeatedly leaving plaintiff. Specifically, Brenda testified 
that the reason she repeatedly left plaintiff was because he got 
"drunk and he pushed me around Tr. 104. Each time Brenda 
returned to plaintiff after temporarily leaving him, she explained 
to him that his drinking, partying and physical abuse of her had 
to stop. Tr. 101. Because the drinking and the physical abuse did 
not stop, Brenda left plaintiff. Tr. 101. Brenda testified: 
Well, every time I left, like in that last few 
months, when I kept going back to Brett, every 
time I would leave, it would be because of some-
thing, some physical violence that he had done. 
That's the reason. 
Tr. 107 (emphasis added). On cross-examination by plaintiff's 
counsel, Brenda also testified: 
Q: Did Brett consistently tell you over the 
period of time that he wanted you, that he wanted 
to make the marriage work, that he wanted you to 
leave Jacobsen alone, and that he loved you and 
that he wanted to keep your marriage together? 
A: Yes, he told me that he wanted to try and 
I wanted to try too but it just didn't work out 
cause Brett would keep getting drunk and he'd 
get violent and it just did not work. 
Tr. 111 (emphasis added). 
Brenda testified that it was plaintiff's alcoholism and his 
physical abuse of her, not defendant or his conduct, which even-
tually caused her to leave plaintiff. Tr. 101. 
In addition to evidence of alcoholism and physical abuse of 
Brenda, some evidence was introduced at trial regarding plaintiff's 
own marital infide~ity. On the night he was terminated from his 
trucking job, plaintiff had a 16-year-old girl in the cab of his 
-17-
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truck during a substantial portion of his shift. Tr. 38. Plain-
tiff admitted that his conduct on that evening was improper. ~. 
38. Linda Springer, the girl who spent part of plaintiff's late 
night shift in the cab of his truck, testified that plaintiff we.s 
drunk on that occasion and "made passes" at her. Tr. 83. 
Moreover, plaintiff admitted that on at least one occasion he 
and Brenda had a confrontation because of his contact with another 
girl. Tr. 42. Additionally, al though Brenda conceded that she was 
not aware of any specific acts of misconduct, she testified that 
upon returning from the Black Mountain outing referred to above, 
she discovered plaintiff at home with "another girl there," a~ 
thereafter, plaintiff took the girl to her home in his truck. Tr. 
96. Finally, defendant testified that on several occasions wh9~ 
fortuitously met plaintiff, Brenda and their friends "around town," 
plaintiff was with Linda Springer. Tr. 74. 
Partially in anticipation of these allegations of impropriety 
and infidelity, plaintiff testified on redirect as follows: 
Q: He also asked you about the contacts and 
conversations with other girls. I [ask] you, 
prior to this problem arising in your marriage 
with this Defendant, have you ever had any 
involvement with any other woman? 
A: No, I didn't. 
Tr. 48 (emphasis added). 
In anticipation of the substantial testimony regarding his 
alcoholism, plaintiff testified that he did not use alcohol "er 
cessively." Tr. 36. Although conceding plaintiff had been arrestd 
for drunk driving prior to his marriage to Brenda and although 
conceding plaintiff's drinking had increased four times since the 
discovery of the alleged relationship between defendant and BrendJ, 
plaintiff's parents' testified that plaintiff did not have an aJcol 
problem any "worse than anybody else." Tr. 58-59; 64-65. 
I 
-18- :On 
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In addition to his testi~ony regarding the specific acts of 
physical abuse referred to above, plaintiff generally denied that 
he had battered or abused Brenda. Plaintiff's testimony, however, 
was substantially inconsistent in one important particular. Plain-
tiff testified that the evening in August of 1979 on which he and 
Brenda were involved in an altercation, was the only occasion on 
which he "had any physical fights that she left and went to [defen-
dant's] place." Tr. 29. He reiterated that position on cross-
examination by stating that this incident was "the first and the 
last" time he "had any physical violence" vis-a-vis Brenda. Tr. 
47. 
Plaintiff also testified that he sustained scratches, bites, 
and bruises from Brenda's kicks and that Brenda sustained no physi-
cal injury whatsoever. Tr. 29. In rebuttal, however, after exten-
sive evidence presented by defendant with respect to the continuous 
course of plaintiff's conduct in abusing and battering his wife, 
plaintiff testified as to an additional fight, on or about October 
27, 1979, between Brenda and himself. Plaintiff introduced Exhibit 
1, a picture purporting to depict the condition of plaintiff's 
chest following the October fight, to substantiate his testimony 
that he was scratched by Brenda during the October altercation. 
(See Exhibit 1.) Plaintiff concluded: 
Tr. 122. 
Q: Can you recall any instance when she left, 
other than the final time of October 27th, which 
was preceded by violence, violent contact 
between you and her? 
A: Absolutely not, no. 
In short, after emphatically stating that the August fight 
constituted the only physical violence between himself and Brenda, 
plaintiff countermanded that testimony by stating that the October 
-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 fight constituted the only occasion of physical violence betw~ 
them. Plaintiff then directly contradicted his earlier testimony 
regarding the fight in the latter part of August or first part of 
September by emphatically stating that on that occasion no physi~ 
violence preceded Brenda's leaving their home to go to defendant's 
home. Tr. 121-122. 
Plaintiff also attempted to ptove at trial that the discoRry 
of the alleged relationship between defendant and Brenda had an 
impact on his employment. Specifically, plaintiff testified th~ 
he changed employment in July of 1979 so that he could "be around 
the home a little more" and "be a little closer to [his] wife .... · 
Tr. 25. Plaintiff also testified that since July of 1979 he had 
not been able to secure steady employment which compensated him at 
the same salary he had been earning at this first job. Tr. 31. 
Upon cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that he had voluntarily 
quit his first job, and he admitted that he had been offered a 
second job prior to his voluntary termination. Tr. 3 7. Irrespect:re 
of what plaintiff's subjective motives were for voluntarily quitiny 
his first job, it is undisputed that plaintiff never communicated 
those motives to his former wife, Brenda Nelson. Brenda testifieo 
under cross-examination: 
Q: Okeh, up until Brett learned of your involve-
ment with Mr. Jacobsen, he didn't have any problem 
at work and he was gainfully employed and regularly 
employed. 
A: There was no problem with me and Mr. Jacob-
~en. Brett just quit his job. I don't have any 
i~ea. He never told me he was quitting to be 
with me. He told me he wasquittingbecause he 
didn't like the coal mines. 
Tr. 102-103 (emphasis added). 
With respect to his second job as a truck driver, plaintiff 
professed a lack of memory with respect to the reason for his 
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termination therefrom. Tr. 37. Plaintiff did admit, however, that 
th~ night of his termination he had been drinking and he had im-
prooerly allowed a 16-year-old girl to be in the cab of his truck 
during a significant portion of his shift. Tr. 38. (As noted 
above, this was the evening plaintiff admitted returning home and 
threatening Brenda with a knife. See, Tr. 45.) 
Brenda testified, however, that plaintiff was fired from his 
trucking job because he was drunk on the evening of his termination 
and because he allowed a young girl to be in the cab of his truck 
during his shift. Tr. 97. Finally, plaintiff's mother testified 
that after he had been fired, plaintiff eventually returned "back 
to the coal mine: the job he originally quit to be "around home a 
little more." Tr. 62. 
The trial court's findings of fact are ambiguously and~­
pletely silent with respect to plaintiff's alcoholism, battery and 
physical abuse of his wife, and marital infidelity. The trial 
court also failed to make any findings with respect to the effects 
of the same on plaintiff and Brenda's marriage. Moreover, the 
trial court made no findings whatsoever with respect to plaintiff's 
employment and the extent to which the alleged conduct of defendant 
had any effect thereon. 
Finally, little evidence, if any, was introduced in support 
of the trial court's findings regarding damages. The only evidence 
with respect to the damages plaintiff allegedly suffered as a 
result of defendant's conduct was as follows: (1) plaintiff testi-
fied that "this thing" had "had an impact" on him, Tr. 31; (2) 
plaintiff's father testified that from June to August of 1979, 
plaintiff's "outlook on life" had changed considerably and 
plaintiff was "terribly hurt and ... he just acted like he wanted 
to be alone," Tr. 54; (3) plaintiff's father also testified that 
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plaintiff "would just shun us," and "spent a lot of time in the 
mountains," Tr. 54; (4) plaintiff's mother acknowledged that ther, 
had been "a significant difference" with respect to plaintiff's 
•overall behavior pattern," Tr. 62; however, (5) plaintiff's mothct 
admitted that he was "on the upswing." Tr. 62. Plaintiff intro-
duced no other evidence of damage. 
2. Brenda Nelson Jacobsen 
Plaintiff testified at trial that he and Brenda first beca~ 
acquainted with defendant sometime in January of 1979. Tr. 18-19, 
There is no evidence in the record to suggest that plaintiff, 
Brenda and defendant had any contact whatsoever prior to January 
1979. Thus, the first contact between the three apparently 
occurred at a New Year's Eve party on December 31, 1978 and Jan~ 
ary 1, 1979. Tr. 67. 
Defendant testified that on that occasion, in the context of 
"a typical New Year's Eve" party, at which "everybody was pretey 
looped," Brenda approached him and told him she wanted to go~ 
bed with him. Tr. 67. This was apparently the first encounter 
between defendant and Brenda, and, according to defendant's un~­
futed testimony, Brenda initiated the contact. The second contact 
between defendant and Brenda was also initiated by Brenda. Defen· 
dant testified at trial, and his testimony was not refuted in a~ 
particular, that approximately one week after the New Year's Eft 
party referred to above, Brenda came to his home at approximateij 
1:00 a.m. Tr. 68. Defendant's testimony was also unrefuted that 
1 
at the time Brenda appeared at his home, defendant observed that 
she had been "physically abused." Tr. 68. Brenda apparently 
stayed on that occasion at defendant's home for a time period of 
approximately 1-1/i hours. Tr. 69. 
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Fro 1n January to June of 1979, it is undisputed that Brend~ 
'.lent tQ_del_cndant 's home on approximately 20 different occasions. 
Tr. 7 3. Plaintiff testified that "she [Brenda] was seeing him 
[Jefendant]" on those occasions. Tr. 2u (emphasis added). Plain-
tiff also testified that Brenda told him "she had been seeing Jeff." 
Tr. 21 (emphasis added). 
Defendant testified that on some of these visits, Brenda was 
accompanied by plaintiff. Tr. 70. Defendant also testified that 
on many of these occasions Brenda was accompanied by friends. 
Tr. 70. Brenda's testimony substantiated defendant's that she 
was "usually" accompanied by friends on the occasions she visited 
defendant at his home, Tr. 98, even on those occasions when Brenda 
visited defendant late at night. Tr. 106. 
Substantial evidence was introduced at trial regarding a 
number of different incidents from June to October of 1979, upon 
which Brenda left plaintiff's home and went to defendant's because 
she had been physically abused by plaintiff, Tr. 28, 77, 99; she 
had fought with plaintiff, Tr. 27-28; she had been "badgered" by 
plaintiff's parents, Tr. 109; she and her girlfriends had nothing 
better to do, Tr. 70; and, simply because she and defendant were 
"good friends." Tr. 87. Brenda specifically testified that on 
these occasions, and during the entire time period at issue in this 
litigation, there was no misconduct of a suggestive or sexual 
nature between defendant and herself. Tr. 98-100. Indeed, ~ 
witness testified at trial with respect to ever having seen ~n_y 
physical contact between Brenda and defendant. See, e.g., Tr. 
56-57. 
In addition to the evidence referred to above, two particular 
incidents are illuminating. First, it was Brenda who initiated 
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the conversation with defendant at the Black Mountain outing, which 
eventually resulted in plaintiff's abuse of her and his altercation 
with defendant. Tr. 96. Second, in approximately August of 1979, 
Brenda decided that she needed to go somewhere to think about her 
problems and "to try to get [her] head together." Tr. 24, 104. In 
order to accomplish these objectives, Brenda asked plaintiff if she 
could go to Las Vegas with defendant. Plaintiff consented. Tr. 
24-25, 26, 39, 77, 104. 
The overwhelming evidence presented at trial clearly indica~s 
that from the first two contacts between defendant and Brenda in 
January of 1979 to October of 1979, Brenda, not defendant, initia~d 
most, if not all, of the contacts. 
3. Defendant Jeff Jacobsen 
In his testimony at trial, defendant admitted that Brenda 
initiated a number of contacts with him during the time period at 
issue in this case, but specifically and emphatically denied any 
sexual misconduct. Tr. 6 7. Brenda corroborated defendant's testi-
mony in this regard. Tr. 98-100. Moreover, no witness testified 
at trial concerning any physical contact which he or she had seen 
between Brenda and defendant. 
Defendant testified, with respect to the occasions upon whicl 
Brenda came to his home, as follows: 
Tr. 78. 
Q: On those occasions as well as all those 20 
occasions early in the year when she came to 
your house, did it ever occur to you to say, 
"Brenda, it's not good for you to be here. 
You better go back to your own house"? 
A: No, because I knew it was just a friendship 
and I was friends with Brett and friends with 
Brenda. The only time I felt I might should 
say something is when she came to my home and 
she was bleeding and I requested she go to her 
father, to which she replied she was afraid 
there wou~d be a physical confrontation after 
her father seen her and what Brett had done to 
her. 
-?4-
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As noted above, on ~any of these occasions, Brenda was accom-
panied by plaintiff and/or other of her friends. Moreover, defen-
dant testified, and his testimony was completely unrefuted, that 
he informed plaintiff of those occasions on which Brenda visited 
defendant unaccompanied by anyone else. Tr. 74. 
It is also undisputed that both plaintiff and Brenda recognized 
that they had problems in their marriage, and both approached 
defendant independently for counsel and advice regarding the same. 
Defendant testified that plaintiff approached him and informed him 
that he and Brenda had a problem in their marriage. Tr. 74. 
Plaintiff requested that defendant help them. Tr. 74. Plaintiff 
did not identify defendant as one of the problems in his marriage 
for which he sought defendant's help. Plaintiff's mother conceded 
that defendant recommended that plaintiff and Brenda seek professional 
counseling for their marital problems. Tr. 63. 
Brenda also testified that she contacted defendant regarding 
her marital problems with plaintiff: 
Q: In the middle of June when we were talking 
out there, you told me that you thought life 
with Brett was getting very unbearable and that 
he had a problem and he was not correcting 
himself at all and you felt like you wanted to 
leave him. Now, what was my response to you? 
A: You told me to do the best I could and try 
with Brett; that we were young, and that we had 
to try and you just told me to go home and try 
it with Brett. 
Q: I did tell you to go home and try to be a 
good wife? 
A: Yes, you did. 
Q: Have I ever done anything to you prior to 
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Tr. 98. 
Q: Did you consider me a friend of the family, 
someone you could come and talk to about your 
problems, day and night? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Linda Springer testified that defendant and she tried to help 
plaintiff and Brenda with their problems. Tr. 87. 
Brenda conceded that defendant had not made, during the time 
period relevant here, any disparaging comments with respect to her 
marriage to plaintiff. Tr. 99. Most importantly, Brenda testified 
as follows with respect to the effect of defendant's conduct on h~ 
marriage with plaintiff: 
Tr. 101. 
Q: You, on the times that you tried to go back 
with Brett and patch up your marriage, did you 
explain to Brett that his drinking, partying, 
and physical abuse had to stop? 
A: Yes, I did several times. 
Q: Did they stop when you went back and tried 
to make the marriage work? 
A: No, they didn't, and that's why I left him 
again. 
Q: You didn't leave him and I didn't personally 
put any stress on your marriage to Brett; did I? 
A: No, you didn't. 
Plaintiff's father testified at trial that on two occasions 
he approached defendant regarding plaintiff and Brenda's marria¥· 
On the first occasion, he testified that he informed defendant tha: 
Brett and Brenda were "having trouble." Tr. 53. Defendant was 
not identified as the source of the trouble, but plaintiff's fath~' 
did request defendant to "leave them alone and let them see if t~ 
can patch it up." Tr. 53. On the second occasion, in approxi~W 
September of 1979, plaintiff's father testified that he again 
approached defendant regarding plaintiff and Brenda's marital 
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difficulties. On that occasion, defendant responded: "'What can I 
do when they're hanging on your door step?'" Tr. 54. 
The trial court's only finding of fact with respect to this 
evidence of defendant's conduct was "that the Defendant did wrong-
fully interfer [sic] with the said marriage and did willfully, 
intentionally and maliciously alienate the affection of Brenda 
Nelson for her husband, Brett Nelson." Tr. 27, finding of fact 
#2. 
In anticipation of defendant's evidence, plaintiff presented 
evidence of two conversations with his wife which bear on the issue 
of misconduct between Brenda and defendant. First, plaintiff 
testified that some time in June, July or August he had a dis-
cussion with her regarding her "involvement with Mr. Jacobsen." 
Tr. 26. In response to counsel's questions regarding the substance 
of that discussion, plaintiff testified: 
Tr. 26. 
At that time I asked her exactly what was going 
on, I wanted to know the truth, and she told me, 
"Don't ask me anything you don't want to hear." 
And I says, "I want to hear it all," and asked 
her how much she had been seeing him, I asked 
her if there was any sexual involvement, and 
she didn't say yes. I asked her how many times, 
once, twice, three, four or five times. She 
didn't answer. I said, "Eight, nine, or ten or 
twelve times." She said, "Yes, probably around 
there." 
Second, plaintiff testified with respect to a conversation he 
had with Brenda while they were "outside riding around in the 
mountains one night." Tr. 27. Plaintiff testified that on that 
occasion: 
Tr. 27. 
She told me not to ask her anything that I didn't 
want to hear and I asked her how many times she'd 
been with him, how much involvement and activity 
she actually had with him, sexually involvement. 
I asked her about that and I finally got her 
down to ten or twelve times. 
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The trial court specifically found "that the Defendant had 
sexual relations with plaintiff's wife on at least six occasions 
while plaintiff's marriage was still in force." R. 27, finding 0, 
fact #4. 
Plaintiff presented no other evidence of defendant's alleg~ 
misconduct. 
As noted above, plaintiff and Brenda were divorced on Februar: 
I 
1, 1980. Defendant and Brenda were married on October 1, 1980. 
Following the presentation of the evidence referred to a~ft 
and the argument of plaintiff's counsel and of defendant, the triai
1 
court orally ruled from the bench as follows: 
The Court finds that the Defendant, Jeff Jacob-
sen, has wrongfully interfered with the marriage 
of Brett W. Nelson and his wife, Brenda Lee 
Nelson; that he alienated her affections from 
her husband's; that he had sexual involvement 
with her on more than six separate occasions; 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff has suffered 
substantial damages and the Court further finds 
that the Defendant is now the Plaintiff's ex-
wife's husband. The Court finds that marriage 
and family--that marriage is a sacred institution 
and that anyone who interferes with that should 
suffer the full consequences of the law and 
I'm telling you, Mr. Jacobsen, at this time that 
this Court nearly every week is having criminal 
trials where people steal money from other people 
and in my opinion you've stolen something far more 
than money, you have interfered with the whole 
basic fabric of society and, when you tell me 
its a plutonic relationship, I just say its 
nonsense. I don't buy it at all and I don't want 
you to think I do. I don't know how they're 
going to collect any money judgments that I give 
against you but they're certainly going to get 
one against you and I hope this gets welipubii-
cized because I'd like everyone to know that if 
a cas~ike this comes into my Court, that they 
can expect to suffer. 
Tr. 123-124 (emphasis added). 
Without making any further findings with respect to the d~ 
of damages plaintiff allegedly suffered, the court awarded judgrc 
against defendant in the amount of $59,600 for past and future 
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loss of consortium. Tr. 28. The tric:ll court also awarded punitive 
damages against defendant in the amount of $25,000, although no 
evidence was introduced at trial with respect to defendant's fin-
ancial worth as a basis for awarding punitive damages. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PURSUANT TO ITS INHERENT AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET 
AND DECLARE THE COMMON LAW OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH AND BASED UPON THE OVERWHELMING POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS OUTLINED BELOW, THIS COURT 
SHOULD ABOLISH AN ACTION AT LAW FOR ALIENATION 
OF AFFECTIOtlS. 
We have become convinced that there is inherent 
and fatal contradiction in the term "alienation 
of affections." The alienation belies the 
affection. Suits for alienation are useless 
as a means of preserving a family. They de-
mean the parties and the courts. We abolish such 
a right of recovery and, hence, reverse and 
set aside the trial court's judgment. 
Fundermann vs. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Iowa 1981). 
The Iowa Supreme Court abolished an action for alienation of 
affections because the fundamental assumptions upon which the 
action is based are no longer valid or persuasive today, and be-
cause overwhelming public policy considerations against preservation 
of the action substantially outweigh the all too insignificant 
benefits to be gained by preservation thereof. Like Iowa, more 
than half of the jurisdictions in this country have abolished 
actions for alienation of affections. Although the Utah Supreme 
Court recognized an action for alienation of affections in Wilson 
vs. Oldroyd, l Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759 (1954), the overwhelming 
historical and public policy considerations hereinafter analyzed 
require this Court, stare decisis notwithstanding, to declare that 
the common law of the State of Utah no longer recognizes an action 
at law for alienation of affections. 
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A, The Social And Domestic Assumptions Upon Which An Actiml 
For Alienation Of Affections Was Historically Predicated Are No 
Longer Valid Or Persuasive Today. 
The early English case of Winsmore vs. Greenbank, 125 Eng. hi 
I 
1330 (1745), recognized a husband's right to an action against~ 
who intentionally "persuaded, procured and enticed" his wife to 
leave the home, resulting in his loss of the wife's "comfort, 
society and assistance." Blackstone acknowledged the existence~ 
such an action at law, noting that the action presupposed for~wj 
I 
constraint, and concluded that a husband's remedy was by a writoi 
ravishment or an action of trespass vi et armis, de~ rapta~ 
abducta. 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries ch. 8, at *139 (Cooley k' 
ed. 1884). Blackstone explained the husband's rights and the 
substance of this kind of action as follows: 
[T]he husband is • entitled to recover 
damages in an action on the case against 
such as persuade and entice the wife to 
live separate from him without a sufficient 
cause. . • [I]f one's wife missed her way 
upon the road, it was not lawful for 
another man to take her into his house un-
less she was benighted and in danger of 
being lost or drowned: but a stranger might 
carry her behind him on horseback to market 
to a justice of the peace for a warrant 
against her husband, or to the spiritual 
court to sue for a divorce. 
2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries ch. 8, at *139 (Cooley 3rd ed. 
1884). 
It is generally recognized that the modern action for aliena· 
I 
tion of affections is but a subsequent historical development~ I 
this early action at law. See, Comment, Alienation of Affect~ 
Flourishing Anachronism, 13 Wake Forest L.Rev. 585, 586 (19771· ' 
Virtually all American jurisdictions incorporated an action f~ 
alienation of affections into their early common law schemes. 
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--
It is universally recognized that the social and domestic 
3ssu~ption upon which an action for alienation of affections was 
originally predicated, was that a wife constituted the exclusive 
chattel of her husband. In fact, a wife was her husband's most 
prized "possession": 
Early courts were exclusively controlled by 
men, and the origin of alienation of affec-
tions must necessarily be considered with 
that in mind. At common law, a wife was 
more than "mere chattel;" she was a man's 
most prized possession. Therefore, enticing 
away a man's wife was perhaps the ultimate 
tort. Such an attitude was exemplified in 
Johnson vs. Allen, [100 Il.C. 131, 139, 5 
S.E. 666, 669 (1888)] when the court asked, 
"What greater tortious injury--deeply 
humiliating and afflicting in its nature--
could be done to a man [than the act of 
enticing away a man's wife and harboring 
and debauching her?]." 
Comment, Alienation of Affections: Flourishing Anachronism, 13 
\·lake Forest L.Rev. 585, 588 (1977) (footnote omitted). 
In short, an action for alienation of affections is histori-
cally rooted in the common law notion that a wife constituted the 
exclusive property of her husband. For the interference with, 
damage to, or theft of his personal pro~erty, a husband enjoyed a 
cause of action, and in those circumstances where the property at 
issue was his wife, such an action was denominated one for "aliena-
tion of affections.• 3 
3Although the primary historical assumption upon which aliena-
tion actions were founded, was that a wife constituted the chattel 
of her husband, this Court, in the context of an action for criminal 
conversation, suggested that an additional basis for this kind of 
litigation is the assumption that each spouse in a marriage has an 
"exclusive right ... to intercourse with the other." Cahoon vs. 
Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959). It is difficult today, 
however, to recognize that anyone has an exclusive_pr~perty right 
to sexual intercourse with his or her spouse. So intimate and so 
sacred is sexual intercourse in marriage that modern public policy 
should dictate that·no one, not even a spouse, has the absolute right 
to demand sexual intercourse of someone else, including his or her 
spouse. Even if this Court were to determine that the public policy 
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It is self-evident, however, that the domestic, social, and 
public policies of the Eighteenth Century are not necessarily th, 
appropriate policies of today, and the longevity of this action 1. 
a minority of other jurisdictions is not, ipso facto, a justifica· 
tion for preserving a tort predicated upon anachronisms. 
A number of jurisdictions have abolished an alienation of 
affections action precisely because the assumption that a wife is 
the property of her husband is anachronistic. Fundermann vs. 
Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Iowa 1981) 
an alienation action is based is "flawed," 
(the theory upon which I 
because such theory is 
"rooted in ideas we have long since renounced, involving wives u 
property"); Wyman vs. Wallace, 15Wash. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71,72' 
(1976), aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (1980) (actionfc:I 
alienation of affections abolished because predicated upon the 
"obsolete" notion that a wife is one of her "husband's chattels"). 
Moreover, the State of Louisiana refused to recognize an action 
I 
alienation of affections because the cause of action at common l~I 
[was] in some measure based upon the .•• obso-
lete idea that the wife is one of the husband's 
chattels, and that her companionship, her ser-
vices and her affections are his property, for 
the loss of which, by wrongful inducement on the 
part of another man, the husband ought to be 
compensated with money. 
Moulin vs. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447, 450 (1927). 
This Court has the inherent power to take judicial notice of 
the evolving social and public policies of our day. Wyman vs. 
of this state allowed one spouse to assert a property right in~ 
act of sexua~ intercourse with the other spouse, nevertheless, ~I 
a property right should not be subect to auction or ransom in th.~ 
context of alienation litigation. That was precisely the concl~ 0 ·1 
of the Iowa Supreme Court in Fundermann vs. Mickelson, 304 N.11.• 
790, 794 (Iowa 1981.) (See finding of fact #6 of the trial court 
in the present case: "each spouse in a marital relationship is~ 
titled to the benefits of consortium R. 28.) 
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\icillace, 94 i·iash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452, 454-455 (1980). 4 It is 
painfully self-evident that the social and public policies of 
Utah no longer recognize that a wife is the exclusive, unique 
property of her husband. Not only are women no longer the chattels 
of their husband, but they have become an influential, intelligent 
and powerful force in government, business and academia. In recent 
years, substantially larger numbers of women have become members of 
the Utah State Bar Association and more recently have occupied the 
benches of various trial courts in this state. In short, the 
public policy of this state jurisdiction no longer recognizes women 
as chattels of their husbands, nor even as inferior in any way to 
men in general. The social and public policies upon which an 
action for alienation of affections was originally predicated, 
therefore, are substantially out-of-step with the controlling 
public policy of this state today. 
The alienation action may well be the last surviving vestige 
in Utah law of the Eighteenth Century anachronism that a wife 
4
see also, Utah Code Annotated §78-25-1 (1977); Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 9. Pursuant to these provisions, this Court has in 
the past taken notice of: (1) the fact that whiskey is intoxicating, 
State vs. Hawkins, 81 Utah 16, 16 P.2d 713 (1932); (2) various 
assumptions about the economic realities of family life and affairs, 
Utah Fuel Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 25, 245 P. 381 
(1926); (3) the contents of the Bible and the general doctrine of 
the Mormon church, including its principle of "celestial marriage,• 
Hilton vs. Roylance, 25 Utah 129, 69 P. 660 (1902); and, (4) the 
fact that passengers on railroad trains are shaken, jostled, and 
occasionally lerched and jerked as part of the unavoidable opera-
tion of trains over grades and around curves. Morrissey vs. Union 
Pacific R. Co., 68 Utah 323, 249 P. 1064 (1926). 
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5 
constituted her husband's exclusive property. To refuse to 
abolish this action would constitute a substantial abdication of 
this Court's responsibility to develop and declare a flexible 
pattern of cor:unon law principles in harmony with and sensitive to' 
i 
the ever-changing needs and realities of modern society. 1 
B. Additional Public Policy Considerations Militate In Favor 
In Favor Of Abolition Of Alienation Actions And Substantially Out-
weight Any Benefits Gained By Preservation Of The Action. 
ti al 
Courts and commentators have recognized a number of substan- I 
policy reasons which militate against preservation of an I 
I 
action for alienation of affections. First, the tort is predic~~: 
upon a number of fictitious assumptions concerning the nature of ; 
the marital relationship: 
Although marriage is valued highly in our society, 
the action for alienation of affections unrealis-
tically defines the extent of that value, and the 
relationship of the marital partners. The mar-
riage, as a union of individuals, will inevitably 
encounter discordant moments. Yet, the tort pro-
ceeds on the fictitious presumption of a perfectly 
harmonious spousal relationship destroyed by the 
thoughtless intruder. This presumption is mis-
leading in two respects. First, though the defen-
dant may not be totally blameless, he would 
ordinarilly not be in such a position had the 
marriage been as strong and viable as the pre-
sumption suggests. As one judge recently stated, 
"any third person who kicks at the cornerstone of 
a shaky marriage will not bring it down without 
active support from one or both of the parties." 
The second reason why the presumption is false 
is that it proceeds upon the premise that the en-
ticed spouse has no individual mind or will, but 
has allowed himself or herself to be led astray, 
to the detriment of the existing marriage. It 
has been argued that since all marriages will 
5
The ?tah Leg~slature statutorily abolished the cc:immon law t,,j 
property rights which a husband could formerly assert in the coo ' 
of "personal injury or wrong to his wife," U.C.A. §30-2-4 (1976), 
including the husband's right to sue a tortfeasor who injured h'.' 
wife for loss of consortium. Tjas vs. Proctor, 591 P. 2d 438, 4' 1' 
(Utah 1979). 
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have rough spots, the marriage partners should 
be left alone to work out their oroblems and 
that those who intervene should be liable. This 
argument, however, erroneously assumes the total 
guilt of the third party and the total innocence 
of the enticed spouse. 
Note, The Suit of Ali_enation of Affections: Can Its Existence Be 
Justified Today? 56 N.D.L.Rev. 237, 251 (1980) (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added). See also, Bearbower vs. Merry, 266 
N.W.2d 128, 138 (Iowa 1978) (McCormick, J., dissenting in part); 
Fundermann vs. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Iowa 1981); 
Wyman vs. Wallace, 94 \'lash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (1980); 
Wyman vs. Wallace, 15 Wash. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71, 74 (1976) (such 
fictitious assumptions presume "an inherent fickleness and frailty 
in human character to which we do not subscribe"). 
Second, there is simply no proof that an action for alienation 
of affections achieves the purpose it was designed to effectuate, 
i.e., the preservation and protection of marriage: 
The premise that the existence of the action 
does help preserve the marital relationship 
has never been documented. To the contrary,. 
an analysis of the action reveals that the 
suit has just the opposite result. First, 
public notice of the action destroys the repu-
tation of both spouses. Even when there is 
no sexual misconduct, or when the action is 
between relatives, the bringing of the action 
serves as public acknowledgement that the 
marriage has gone awry. It is unlikely that 
this personal embarrassment will strengthen 
or preserve the marital bond. Second, the very 
nature of the action serves as a destructive 
influence on the marriage. The action tends 
to bring out the worst in people. As stated 
by one judge, "[a] prime motivation for 
bringing the action is often the need of the 
plaintiff to vindicate his or her position 
and justify one's own past shortcomings." 
Greed, revenge, spite and a desire to humiliate 
others in sacrifice of one's own dignity seem 
inherent in the suit. The plaintiff appears 
as an individual engaging in self-degradation 
by translating marital values into monetary 
terms. This situation can hardly serve as 
a constructive influence on preserving a 
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stable marital relationship between two 
mature adults. 
Note, The Suit of Alienation of Affections: ~an Its Existence ~ 
Justified Today? 56 N.D.L.Rev. 237, 251-252 (footnotes omitted), i 
(Emphasis added.) See, also, Wyman vs. Wallace, 15 Wash. App. 
395, 397, 549 P.2d 71, 73 (1976), aff'd 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 
452, 455 (1980); H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the 
United States §10.2, at 267 (1968). 
Third, overwhelming practical problems of proof of causatioo j 
and damages render an action for alienation of affections suscept::j 
to a broad range of injustices: 
One inequitable facet of the alienation tort is 
the inherent difficulty in determining liability. 
In the frequent case today when the marriage has 
gone awry, due in part to the plaintiff's con-
duct, the jury in a case involving extramarital 
relations has the task of determining the pur-
suer and the pursued. Such a decision would be 
difficult for a trained social scientist, much 
less for an impressionable-jury in this emotional 
setting ••• By their nature, such lawsuits are 
susceptible to the inflammatory plea and atti-
tude of the plaintiff directed toward the 
scheming defendant, while encouraging a sympa-
thetic jury to reach a verdict on the basis of 
passion and prejudice. Such a scenario has a 
great potential for injustice. 
The plaintiff's right of redress must also be 
balanced against the destructive influence of 
damages in the action. Damage awards in an 
alienation of affections suit are difficult 
to determine since intangible injuries are in-
volved. The jury must consider not only the 
loss of consortium in setting an award, but 
also the injuries done to the plaintiff's 
health, reputation and mental state. These 
damages must in turn be mitigated by the lack 
of affection between the spouses and the un-
happy marital relations before the interfer-
ence. Because there is no standard of measure-
ment by which the jury can value these intangible 
rights, jury verdicts in this area of the law 
are frequently arbitrary and excessive. These 
excessive awards are especially unjust in the 
many cas~s where the plaintiff sues not out of 
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a desire to mend the already torn marriage, 
but for vindictive and mercenary reasons. 
r;ote, The Suit of Alienation of Affections: Can Its Existence Be 
Justified Today? tl.D.L.Rev. 237, 252-253 (1980) (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
Fourth, the threat of initiating an alienation of affections 
action is a powerful tool of extortion: 
Weighing heavily against the plaintiff's right 
of recompense is the potential for abuse in 
the action and the harmful effect the tort 
has on innocent people. The injuries suffered 
by the publicity of such a suit can frequently 
outweigh the injury that caused the action. 
Since there exists such potential to damage 
reputations, the threat to sue can easiTY-be-
come, in effect, an extortion scheme. 
Note, The Suit of Alienation of Affections: Can Its Existence Be 
Justified Today? N.D.L.Rev. 237, 253 (1977) (emphasis added). 
Courts and commentators have characterized actions for alienation 
of affections as "legalized blackmail." M. Grossman, The New York 
Law of Domestic Relations §313 (1947); Wyman vs. Hallace, 15 Wash. 
App. 395, 549 P.2d 71, 72 (1976), aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 
452, 455 (1980). 
Finally, an alienation of affections action unreasonably, and 
perhaps unconstitutionally, interferes with and impinges upon the 
defendant's right of privacy. The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, the right of 
privacy enjoyed by every citizen. Griswold vs. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965). This right of privacy is particularly sensitive 
in the area of personal and sexual relationships between individuals. 
Eisenstadt vs. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). As one commentator 
noted: 
Regardless of its constitutio~al di~ensions or 
its basis in tort law, the privacy interest 
in freedom of choice as to emotional and 
sexual issues in one's life is important, and 
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the question whether the alienation of affec-
tions action promotes or hinders protection of 
that interest is another factor to weigh in 
determining the utility of the action. The 
question is almost rhetorical, since even a 
cursory evaluation of the tort makes it appar-
ent that the action interferes with this 
interest. The tort undeniably allows society's 
intrusion into the emotional and sexual realm·· 
of another's life. 
--
Note, The Suit of Alienation of Affections: Can Its Existence Be 
Justified Today? 56 N.D.L.Rev. 237, 255 (1980) (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
These public policy considerations substantially militate 
against preservation of the alienation of affections action. In 
short: (1) the action is predicated upon fictitious assumptions 
about the nature of the marital relationship; (2) there is simply 
no proof that the action achieves the purpose it was designed to 
effectuate, i.e., the preservation and protection of marriage; (3) 1 
! 
overwhelming practical problems of proof of causation and damages 
render an action for alienation of affections susceptivel to a 
broad range of injustices; (4) the threat of initiating an alien~ 1 
tion of affections action is a powerful tool of extortion; and, (l.1 
an alienation of affections action unconstitutionally and unrea~~ 
ably interferes with and impinges upon the defendant's constitutio:i 
rights of sexual privacy. 
In its oral ruling after the close of the evidence in the 
present case, the trial court expressed essentially three justifr 
cations for preservation of the action: (l ) an alienation actior 
creates and preserves respect for the sanctity of marriage; (21 
such an action prevents "theft" of the plaintiff's wife by inter 
meddling interlopers; and, (3) the action, if "well-publicized" 
will let "everyone · •.• know that if a case like this comes intc 
my Court [sic], that they can expect to suffer." Tr. 123-124. 
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These justifications are wholly unpersuasive. 
First, as noted above, an alienation action in no way pre-
serves the sanctity of marriage. In fact, it more seriously and 
more substantially undermines marriages, often driving the 
allegedly alienated spouse completely away from the plaintiff 
into a divorce court. As one court recently noted: 
Increasingly, the states reject and renounce the 
right of an alienation recovery because the 
existence of such a right is itself a slander 
on marriage. As pointed out in Bearbower, 266 
N.W. 2d at 137 (dissenting opinion): 
Still another [reason for abolishing 
this suit] is the peculiar light 
which the whole proceeding throws on 
the nature of marriage, leaving one 
with the conviction that the success-
ful plaintiff has engaged in something 
which looks very much like a sale of 
his wife's affections. Most signifi-
cantly of all, the action for aliena-
tion is based on psychological 
assumptions that are contrary to fact. 
Quoting H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, 
§10.2 at 267 (1968). 
fund~rmann vs. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Iowa 1981). 
Second, the notion that an alienation of affections action 
will protect against the "theft" of plaintiff's wife, is palpably 
absurd and wholly specious. As the Iowa Supreme Court recently 
noted: 
The [alienation] action has survived in the 
hope that it affords some protection to 
existing family relationships. But this 
lofty hope has proven illusory. Human ex-
perience is that the affections of persons 
who are devoted and faithful are not sus-
ceptible to larceny--no matter how CUi1rllng 
or stealthful. And it is folly to hope any 
longer that a married person who has bec?me_ 
inclined to philander can be preserved w1th1n 
an affectionate marriage by the threat of an 
alienation suit. If we did pretend that a 
would-be paramour would be thereby dissuaded, 
a substitute is likely to be readily found. 
* * * 
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In the last analysis we think the action 
should be abol ishecf because spousal love 
is not property which is subject to !_heft. 
We do not abolish the action because defen-
dants in such suits, need or deserve our 
protection. We certainly do not do so 
because of anycFlanging-views on promiscuo_lls 
sexual conduct. It is merely and simply be-
cause the plaintiffs in such suits do not 
deserve to recover for the loss-or-1r1]i:irY to 
"property" which they do not, and cannot, 
own. 
Fundermann vs. Mikelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791-792, 794 (Iowa 
1981). 
Finally, the trial court in the case at bar reasoned that 
publicity of the present action and plaintiff's success therein 
would constitute sufficient public warning to prevent future in-
cidents like the one involved in this litigation. Such reasoning, 
however, cannot sustain the preservation of this action. Healthy 
marriages are simply not made healthier by the threat of a lawsuit. 
Likewise, the threat of litigation cannot preserve a troubled 
marriage because such a threat in no way eradicates the underlyi~ 
causes of the trouble and discord. At best, the threat of litiga-
tion compels already troubled marital partners to continue to liR 
together in their disharmony. The social value of such an arrange· 
ment does not constitute a sufficient justification for the 
preservation of an action for alienation of affections. See, 
Sadleir vs. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 296 P.2d 278, 279-280 (1956) 
("The State is not interested in perpetuating a marriage after all 
possibility of accomplishing any desirable purpose of such relation· 
ship is gone ."). As Professor Clark noted: 
As has been indicated, viable, contented mar-
riages are not broken up by the vile seducer 
of the Nineteenth Century melodrama, though 
this is what the suit for alienation assumes. 
In fact the breakup is the product of many 
influences. It is therefore misleading and 
futile to suppose that the threat of a damage 
suit can protect the marital relationship. ~ 
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r:. Clark, The La11 of l))m<cstic !<elations in the Unit_e_<:!_.States §10.2 
at 267 (1':16b); see als()_, l-lyr;ian vcs. \icillace, 15 \'iash. App. 395, 549 
f'.2d 71, 74 (1976), ~ff'd, 94 \lash. 2c1 99, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (1980). 
In short, the justifications espoused by the trial court in 
this case for preservation of the action are wholly without merit. 
The public policy considerations analyzed above have led the 
majority of jurisdictions in this country to abolish the common 
law action for alienation of affections. 
C. The Majority Of Jurisdictions In This Country Have Abolished 
Actions At Law For Recovery Of Money Damages For Alienation Of Affec-
tions. 
Because the traditional social and public policy assumptions 
upon which an alienations action was historically predicated are 
inapposite today and in view of the overwhelming public policy 
considerations which militate against preservation of the aliena-
tion action, eighteen states and the District of Columbia have 
abolished all actions at law and suits in equity for alienation of 
affections. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §25-341 (Supp. 1980-1981); Cal. 
Civ. Code §43.5 (West 1954); Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-20-202 (1973); 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §52-572b (West Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 10, §3924 (1974); D.C. Code Encycl. §16-923 (\'lest Supp. 1978-
1979); Ga. Code Ann. §30-109.l (1980); Ind. Code Ann. §34-4-4-1 
(Burns Supp. 1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §167 (1981); Md. 
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §5-30l(a) (1980); Mich. Comp. Laws 
§600.2901 (1968) (Mich. Stat. Ann. §27A.2901 (1980)); llinn. Stat. 
Ann. §553.02 (West supp. 1981); Mont. Code Ann. §27-1-601 (1979); 
Nev. Rev. Stat. §41.380 (1979); Or. Rev. Stat. §30.840 (1979); Va. 
Code §8.01-220 (1977); w. Va. Code §56-3-2A (Supp. 1980); Wis. 
Stat. Ann. §768.01 (West 1980); Wyo. Stat. §1-23-101 (1977). 
-41- ;11, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitizati n provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Six jurisdictions have abolished all alienation actions at 
law for the recovery of money damages, without, however, abolishinc 
possible alienation suits in equity for injunctive relief. Ala. j 
Code §6-5-331 (1977) (injunction permitted, see Logan vs. 
• j 
Davids~,, 
282 Ala. 327, 330, 211 So.2d 461, 463 (1968) ); Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§771.01(West1964); 6 N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:23-l (West 1952); N.Y. 
Civ. Rights Law §80-a (McKinney 1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2305.2\ 
(Page Supp. 1980); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §1001 (Supp. 1980-1981), 
In addition, two states have statutorily abolished all alienation 
actions or suits with but insignificant exceptions. Okla. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 76, §8.l (West Supp. 1980-1981) (action permitted only 
if spouse was incompetent or minor at time. of alleged alienation); 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 48, §170 (Purdon 1965) (action permitted only 
if defendant is a blood relative of plaintiff). 
Two jurisdictions have abolished by judicial decision all 
alienation actions and suits. Wyman vs. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 
6The policy statement in the preamble to Florida's statute 
abolishing alienation of affections actions provides: 
Whereas, the remedies provided for by law for 
the enforcement of actions based upon alleged 
alienation of affections have been subjected 
to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, 
embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary 
damage to many persons wholly innocent and 
free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the 
victim of circumstances, and such remedies 
having been exercised by unscrupulous persons 
for their unjust enrichment and such remedies 
having furnished vehicles for the commission 
or attempted commission of crime and in many 
cases having resulted in the perpetration of 
frauds, exploitation and blackmail, it is 
hereby declared as the public policy of the 
State of Florida that the best interest of the 
people of the State will be served by the 
abolition of such remedies. 
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615 P.2c: 452, 455 (J'J80); f'unrlen·.ilnn ·1s. 'iickelson, 304 :l.l'/.2d 790, 
791 (Io"13 1981). 1>cic:ctionall:;, the: State of Louisiana r.as never 
recognizC"ci the alienation tort. :1oul~ri vs. Monteleone, 165 La. 
169, 178, 115 So. 447, 451 (1927), accorc!, Ohl_~usen vs. Brown, 572 
So.2d 787, 788 (La. App. 1979). The Alaska Supreme Court has 
apparently never considered whether an alienation action obtains 
in that state--neither case law nor statutory provisions regarding 
the issue exist. 
Three jurisdictions, although retaining the tort, view it with 
disfavor. Ferriter vs. Daniel O'Connell's Son, Inc., 80 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 2075, 413 N.E.2d 690, 694 (1980) (alienation actions disfavored); 
Dube vs. Rochette, 110 N.H. 129, 130, 262 A.2d 288, 289 (1970) 
(actions susceptible to abuse, but legislative judgment to allow 
continuance of action would be respected); Thompson vs. Chapman, 
93 N.M. 356, 358, 600 P. 2d 302, 304 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) cert. 
denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d 1078 (1979) (appellete court would 
abolish tort if it had authority to do so). 
Three states have shortened their statute of limitations on 
alienation actions to one year. Ark. Stat. Ann. §37-201 (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1979); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §413.140(1) (c) (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1980) (includes alienation actions, see, Skaggs vs. 
Stanton, 532 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Ky. 1975); R.I. Gen. Law §9-1-14 
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980). 
Finally, four states employ substantially difficult burdens 
of proof in alienation actions. Hunt vs. Chang, 594 P.2d 118, 123 
(Hawaii 1979) (5-prong burden of proof); Long vs. Fischer, 210 
Kan. 21, 25-26, 499 P.2d 1063, 1067 (1972) (5-prong test for 
burden of proof); Thompson vs. Chapman, 93 N.M. 356, 358, 600 P.2d 
302, 303-304 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) cert. denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593 
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P. 2d 1078 (1979)) (plaintiff must show existence of affection ano 
that defendant maliciously caused alienation by direct interfe~n~ 
Heist vs. Heist, 46 N.C. App. 521, 523, 265 S.E.2d 434, 436 (1980) 
(plaintiff must show existence of genuine love and that malicious 
acts of defendant produced loss). 
In short, 28 states have abolished alienation actions at I~ 1 
for the recovery of money damages. If Alaska, Pennsylvania and 
Oklahoma are included, the total number of jurisdictions abolish!~ 
this tort is 31. To the extent that the term "common law" implies 
law common to a majority of the jurisdictions of this country, it i 
cannot be said, in view of the fact that 31 of the 50 states haw 
abolished alienation actions, that such an action remains a part 
of American common law. 
In Cahoon vs. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959), this 
Court noted that it would not look to or recognize the common law 
of England, to which an action for alienation of affections traces 
its origin, in those situations where English common law was not 
"suitable to our conditions, morals, history and background." 
Cahoon, supra, 342 P.2d at 98. Rather, this Court noted in~ 
that it would look "to the system of common law and equity which 
prevails in and has been and is now being developed by the decis~ 
of this country," and would "reject the common law of England whicr. 
is not suitable or adapted to our needs, morals or ideas.• Cahoon, -
supra, 342 P.2d at 98 (emphasis added). 
It should be noted that virtually all of the jurisdictions 
which have abolished the tort of alienation of affections have 
done so in the past ten years and that the Utah Supreme Court ha 5 
not had the opportl'.nity to consider a case of alienation of auc-
tions since Wilson and Sadleir cited infra. 
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In vi~~ of the overwhelming rejection by American jurisdictions 
of the tort of alienation of affections and based upon the authority 
of Cahoon, this Court should, pursuant to its power and authority 
to interpret and declare the common la~ of this state, abolish all 
actions for recovery of money damages predicated upon an alleged 
alienation of affections. 
D. This Court Has The Inherent Power To Abolish The Tort Of 
Alienation Of Affections. 
It is beyond dispute that the tort of alienation of affections 
is a judicially-created doctrine in this state. See, Wilson vs. 
Oldroyd, l Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759 (1954). It is also beyond 
dispute that this Court has the inherent power to interpret and 
declare the common law of this jurisdiction. Part and parcel of 
that authority is the power to create new causes of action, see, 
e.g., Ernest w. Hahn, Inc. vs. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1979) (cause of action sounding in strict tort liability recognized 
for injuries resulting from defective products), and to abolish 
antiguated common law doctrines which have ceased to serve the 
purpose for which they were originally created by the judiciary. 
See, Jacobsen Construction Co. vs. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc., 
619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980) (common law doctrine of "assumption of 
risk" abolished; plaintiff's culpable conduct to be determined 
henceforth with reference to comparative negligence principles). 
As noted above, two jurisdictions have judicially abolished aliena-
tion actions. In \lyman vs. \lallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 
(1980), the Washington Supreme Court acknowledged its inherent 
authority to interpret and declare the common law of that juris-
diction and hence to abolish alienation actions: 
--
No doubt has ever been expressed regarding the 
courts' power to abolish this judicially 
created action for alienation of a spouse's 
affections. Our original decision in this case ' 
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recognized that "a rule of law which has its 
origin in the common law and which has not been 
specifically enacted by the legislature may be 
modified or abolished by the courts when such 
revision is mandated by changed conditions." 
[Citations omitted.] Every jurisdiction that 
has thus far abolished the tort of alienation 
of a spouse's affections has done so legisla-
tively. However, the mere fact that the 
legislatures in these other states abolished 
the cause of action before the question of 
abolition was properly presented to the respec-
tive courts, does not mean that every state 
court must wait for the legislature to focus 
its attention on this subject. [Citations--
omitted.] In the instant case, the question 
of abolition of the action has been squarely 
presented to the courts of this state and, 
since the action was created judicially, the 
courts have the power to resolve this question. 
Wyman vs. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452, 453-454 (1980) 
(emphasis added). 
On May 7, 1981, the Supreme Court of Iowa also abolished 
alienation actions in that jurisdiction. Noting that an "unmis- , 
takable trend away from allowing alienation suits" exists in this 
country, the Iowa Supreme Court observed: 
It is sometimes suggested that the abrogation 
of a right, even a common-law right, should 
come from the legislature rather than from 
the courts. This suggestion was already laid 
to rest in Bearbower [vs. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 
128 (Iowa 1978)]. In Bearbower, though we 
were in wide disagreement on the underlying 
and fundamental issue in the case, we were 
unanimous in believing it was for us and not 
for the legislature to end the right of this 
recovery if it were to be ended. 
Fundermann vs. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 793 (Iowa 1981) {emphas!' 
added). 7 See also, Doe vs. Doe, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1412, 390 N.W.i, 
7
Iowa law is, in general, similar to the law of this sta~. 
and distinguished members of this Court have of ten looked to t~ 
law of Iowa as persuasive authority upon unsettled issues in thiO 
jurisdiction. See, Sadleir vs. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 296 P.2o 
278, 281 (1956)----nfenriod, J., dissenting). 
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~30, 732-733 (1979) (Supreme Juclicial Court of ilass2chusetts has 
lnherent power to jurlicially abolish alienation of affections tort). 
In short, this Court has inherent power to abolish actions 
for alienation of affections. Moreover, the doctrine of stare 
dccisis is not an impediment to abolition. Noting that "[t)he 
genius of the common law is its flexibility and capacity for growth 
and adaptation" the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine 
of stare decisis could not undermine its obligation "to abandon 
antiquated doctrines and concepts." Fundermann vs. Mickelson, 304 
t:.ll.2d 790, 793 (Iowa 1981). 
This Court long ago recognized, "that the doctrine of stare 
decisis is not an inflexible rule, and that there are occasions 
where it becomes the duty of the court to re-examine questions 
involved, and again subject them to judicial scrutiny." Kimball 
vs. City of Grantsville, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 7, 9 (1899). Specifi-
cally, the court in Kimball noted that: 
[w)here, however, there has been but a single 
decision, which is clearly erroneous, and 
important private or public rights are con-
cerned • . the doctrine of stare decisis 
ought not to be applied, so as to prevent a 
reconsideration of the former. 
~· 57 P. at 8 (emphasis added). 
There are but two decisions in this state which have directly 
recognized and upheld a cause of action based upon alleged aliena-
tion of affections. 8 Wilson vs. Oldroyd, l Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 
759 (1954); Sadleir vs. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 296 P.2d 278 (1956). 
Por over two decades, this Court has not considered the continued 
viability of actions for alienation of affections. It is defendant's 
8 rn Cahoon vs. ,Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959), 
plaintiff brought an iction for both alienation of affections and 
criminal conversation. This Court's opinion in that case treated 
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position that these two cases are "clearly erroneous" for our day, 
and the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent reconsiderati~ 
and abolition of the same. Kimball vs. City of Grantsville, 19 
Utah 368, 57 P. 7, 8 (1899). 
From the foregoing, it is self-evident that the social and 
policy considerations upon which the alienation action was origi-
nally founded, are outdated and inconsistent with modern ideas a~ 
beliefs concerning the rights of women and the nature of the 
marital relationship. Moreover, the overwhelming public policy 
considerations referred to above suggest that the alienation actio~I 
I 
does not achieve the ends it was originally designed to achieve 
and, far worse, serves as a tool of extortion and fraud. So 
persuasive are these considerations that a majority of jurisdiction;• 
in this country have abolished alienation actions. No impediment, 
including the doctrine of stare decisis, prevents this Court from 
abolishing alienation actions in this jurisdiction. Justice 
Henriod recognized the persuasiveness of the policy reasons set 
forth above which militate in favor of abolishing the alienation 
tort: 
So fraught with chance for fraud, and so dis-
tasteful as to type of litigation are suits to 
recover money for the alienation of a wife's 
affections, that fourteen states have taken 
steps, to outlaw such litigation, including the 
state to the east and the one to the west of us. 
Sadleir vs. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 296 P.2d 278, 282 (1956) (dis-
senting opinion) (footnote omitted). Justice Henriod also suggest'i 
in that opinion the position which defendant urges this Court n~ 
to take; namely, "to relegate this type of litigation to oblivion· 
Id. 
contain some dicta regarding a husband• s right to maintain an act 
for alienation of his wife's affections. Id., 342 P.2d at 99, 
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POIU'l' II 
THE '~RIAL COtJ:<.T 'S UL'l'I'tATE DETERMILIATIO:J OF 
LIABILITY AtlD FitlDitiGS OF'Fl\CT ARE \/HOLLY 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL. 
It is the law of this jurisdiction that on appeal, the trial 
court's findings of fact are entitled to some degree of deference 
from this Court. The trial court's findings, however, must be 
supported by substantial evidence: 
The rules of appellate review generally pre-
clude this Court from substituting its judg-
ment for that of the trial court on factual 
issues. However, the trial court is bound 
to make factual determinations to support its 
legal conclusions and said findings must be 
supported by substantial evidence. 
Hidden Meadows Development Co. vs. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1250 
(Utah 1979) (emphasis added). 
Not only must the trial court's findings be supported by sub-
stantial evidence, but they must also be specific and detailed: 
The importance of complete, accurate and con-
sistent findings of fact in a case tried by a 
judge is essential to the resolution of dis-
pute under the proper rule of law. To that end 
the findings should be sufficiently detailed 
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
tF!eSteps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reach~d. [Ci tat ions 
omitted.] The rule as stated in Prows vs. 
Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31, 33 (1928) is: 
that until the court has found on all 
the material issues raised by the 
pleadings, the findings are insuffi-
cient to support a judgment; and that 
findings should be sufficiently distinct 
and certain as not to require an 
investigation or review tOCfetermine 
what issues were decided. 
Rucker vs. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338-1339 (Utah 1979) (emphasis 
added). 
It is self-evident that "it is not the function of an appellate 
court to make findings of fact." Rucker vs. Dalton, supra, at 1338 
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I' 
I 
(Utah 1979). Therefore, unless the findings of fact are supported 
by substantial evidence; are complete, accurate and consistent; 
and are sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached, "application of the proper rule of law 
is difficult, if not impossible, and the reviewing function of this, 
Court is seriously undermined." Rucker, supra, at 1339. 
Unlike its findings of fact, the trial court's conclusions of 
law are not entitled to special deference on appeal. In short, 
this Court may make its own determinations with respect to the lo 
applicable to the established facts. See, Hardy vs. Hendrickson, 
27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28, 29 (1972). 
In the present case, of course, if the trial court's findin~ 
of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, defendant is 
entitled to reversal. If this Court concludes that the findings 
are incomplete, inaccurate or inconsistent, defendant is entitled 
to reversal and remand for a new trial for the purpose of allowi~ 
the parties to present sufficient evidence to enable the trial 
court to make complete, competent findings. 
Mindful of these propositions and the burden he bears on 
appeal, it is defendant's position that the trial court's ulti-
mate determination of liability and findings of fact are wholly 
unsupported in three particulars, to-wit: (1) plaintiff failed to 
sustain his burden of proving that defendant wilfully and inten-
tionally alienated Brenda's affections for plaintiff; ( 2) the tric-
court's findings regarding compensatory damages are unsupported~ 
the evidence, excessive and based upon improper considerations, 
including passion and prejudice; and, ( 3) the trial court's fin3-
ings regarding punitive damages are unsupported by the eviden~· 
excessive, and based upon improper considerations • 
.............. -.------~~~~-SO-
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A. £_}~1_n_t_iff Failed To Sustain His flurclen Of Proving _ _!ha_!:_ 
~efendant Intentionally And \iilfully Alienated Brenda's Affections 
For Plaintiff. 
Although some jurisdictions have declined to abolish aliena-
tion litigation, nevertheless, because of the overwhelming histori-
cal, social and public policy considerations referred to in Point I 
above, many states which have retained alienation actions have 
intensified plaintiff's burden of proof. The purposes, of course, 
of increasing plaintiff's burden of proof are to eliminate some of 
the abuses inherent in this kind of litigation and to eliminate 
some of the difficulties associated with proof of causation and 
damages in the typical alienation action. Of the varied approaches 
of other jurisdictions in this regard, the approach of Kansas and 
Hawaii is the most persuasive because it is most likely to achieve 
the purpose of eliminating abuse and the problem of proving 
causation and damages. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas held in Long vs. Fischer, 210 Kan. 
21, 499 P.2d 1063 (1972), that to maintain a cause of action for 
alienation of affections, plaintiff has the following burden of 
proof: 
(1) The defendant must have exercised improper, 
willful and malicious influence on the wayward 
spouse in derogation of the plaintiff's marital 
rights. 
(2) The wayward spouse must not have voluntarily 
accepted defendant's advances at the outset of 
the affair. 
( 3) The wayward spouse must not hc:ive ac~i vely 
contributed to the procuration by intent:onally 
seeking the companionship and the affection of 
the defendant. 
(4) The plaintiff must prove he or she was not 
at fault in causing the other spouse's affec-
tions to .stray. 
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(5) The willful and malicious influence of the 
defendant on the wayward spouse must be proven 
as the procuring cause of the loss of the love 
and affection which the wayward spouse formerly 
held for the plaintiff. 
Id., 499 P. 2d at 1067 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court 
of Hawaii recently adopted the Kansas standard. Hunt vs. Chang, 
594 P.2d 118, 124 (Hawaii 1979). 
For the reasons outlined above, this Court should adopt the 
Kansas standard. If that standard was applied to the facts of the 
present case, defendant would be entitled to reversal upon four 
independent grounds. First, assuming arguendo that plaintiff 
proved at trial that defendant exercised improper and wilful in-
fluence over Brenda, in derogation of plaintiff's marital rights, 
nevertheless, plaintiff wholly failed to establish that defendant , 
made any advances to Brenda and he failed to establish that Bren~ 
did not voluntarily accept any such advances at the outset of the 
affair. There is virtually no evidence in the record to conclusivelf 
establish that defendant made improper advances to Brenda. No one 
witnessed any physical contact between plaintiff and Brenda thro~~ 
out the time period at issue in this litigation. Moreover, most~I 
the contacts between defendant and Brenda were in the presence of 
other persons, including plaintiff. Both defendant and Brenda 
testified that they did not engage in any kind of misconduct of a 
sexual nature. Although plaintiff testified concerning two con-
versations he had with Brenda regarding her alleged "sexual 
involvement" with defendant, no testimony was adduced at trial wi~ 
respect to who initiated the alleged sexual relationship between 
them. Finally, even if the trial court's ultimate determination 
with respect to liability could be deemed to be an implicit findin1 
that defendant, not Brenda, initiated the sexual relationship, 
nevertheless, there is absolutely no evidence that Brenda refused, 
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at the outset, to voluntarily accept defendant's alleged advances. 
Tn the contrary, there is substantial evidence that Brenda initi-
ated the majority of contacts between herself and defendant. (See 
he low.) 
Second, there is substantial, if not overwhelming, evidence 
that Brenda actively and voluntarily contributed to defendant's 
alleged procuration of her affections for plaintiff by intentionally 
soliciting the companionship and affection of defendant. The trial 
court failed to find as fact the date upon which Brenda's alleged 
relationship with defendant began. The only testimony at trial on 
this issue, however, clearly indicates that their relationship 
began at a New Year's Eve party on December 31, 1978 and January 1, 
1979. According to defendant, although she may have been under the 
influence of alcohol, Brenda approached him regarding going to bed 
with her. There was no evidence whatsoever at trial that defendant 
solicited contact with Brenda on this occasion. Moreover, defendant 
testifieq that approximately one week after the New Year's Eve 
party, Brenda came to his home. There was no evidence to suggest 
that defendant invited Brenda's presence there. In fact, to the 
contrary, the evidence suggested that 3renda had been physically 
abused by plaintiff and had sought refuge and safety at defendant's 
home. 
From January to June of 1979, Brenda went to defendant's home 
on at least 20 occasions. There was no evidence to suggest that 
Brenda went to defendant's home pursuant to his invitation or 
request. To the contrary, the evidence clearly indicated that 
Brenda went to plaintiff's home on these occasions because she had 
been physically abused by plaintiff; she had been badgered by 
plaintiff's parents~ or, she and her girlfriends had nothing better 
to do. Plaintiff's testimony in this regard is revealing. Plain-
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tiff pecifically characterized the nature of Brenda and defendant', 
relationship as one in which "she was seeing him." Plaintiff al~ 
testified that Brenda told him "she had been seeing Jeff." Neithe'. -----
plaintiff nor Brenda characterized Brenda's relationship with de-
fendant as one in which defendant had initiated the advances or 
contacts, or as one in which defendant was seeing Brenda. In 
short, the overwhelming evidence at trial clearly establishes that, 
from December 31, 1978 to October of 1979, Brenda intentionally a~ 
voluntarily sought defendant's companionship and affection. 
Third, the overwhelming evidence presented at trial clearly 
established that plaintiff's conduct significantly contributed to 
the alienation of Brenda's affections. A complete review of the 
evidence outlined above is not necessary here. By his own admis-
sions, plaintiff slapped Brenda and pushed her to the ground on at 
least one occasion. Mature, dedicated and loving marital partnen 
simply do not physically assault each other. The conflict in the 
testimony below was not if plaintiff assaulted Brenda, it was 
how many times. In that regard, defendant, Linda Springer and 
Brenda's father testified regarding numerous occasions on which 
they had seen Brenda physically battered and abused following 
altercations with plaintiff. Brenda also gave extensive testimon~ 
regarding plaintiff's abuse of her. On the occasion on which 
plaintiff admitted slapping and pushing Brenda to the ground, 
defendant, Brenda and her father gave substantial testimony with 
respect to the serious nature of her injuries. Finally, Linda 
Springer and Brenda herself testified that plaintiff's conduct in 
continually abusing and battering Brenda was the primary factor i: 
alienating Brenda's affections for plaintiff. 
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Morcoi,._::, plai 11tiff hacl a SCic:cc alcohol probler~ during the 
Plaintiff's repeated drinking 
often precipitated the acts of physical abuse regarding which 
various witnesses testified at trial. Plaintiff was fired from 
his trucking job in substantial part because of his alcohol abuse. 
Plaintiff's own marital infidelity eventually became a serious 
issue in his marriage to Brenda. Plaintiff admitted confrontations 
with Brenda regarding his contacts with other \/omen. Evidence was 
adduced at trial that plaintiff spent substantial time periods 
alone with other wo~en. If opportunity alone ~as the primary 
criterion for measuring marital infidelity, then plaintiff, like 
Brenda, could not escape the charge of adultery. 
The realities of the marital relationship dictate that a hus-
band cannot long physically batter and abuse his wife and expect 
her to ''love, honor and obey" him. Moreover, serious recurrent 
abuses of alcohol erode, if not eradicate, reciprocal spousal re-
spect and affection. In short, plaintiff's long history of victimizing 
Brenda, as a matter of law, must be deemed to be a substantial, if 
not the primary cause of the alienation of Brenda's affections for 
him. 
Fourth, assuming arguend~ that defendant exercised improper 
and willful influence over Brenda, in derogation of plaintiff's 
marital rights, there is absolutely no proof that defendant's 
conduct was the "procuring cause" of the loss of love and affection 
which Brenda formerly held for plaintiff. This conclusion logi-
cally follows from the facts that Brenda voluntarily and intentionally 
sought defendant's companionship and affection and that plaintiff 
himself was the primary cause in alienating Brenda's affections 
for him. 
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In short, if this Court adopts the Kansas standard, the causr: 
must be reversed with directions to the trial court to enter judg-
ment for defendant. The evidence below clearly indicates that 
plaintiff wholly failed to sustain his burden of proof. But even 
if this Court declines to adopt the more stringent Kansas standa~, 
reversal is nevertheless required because plaintiff failed to 
sustain his burden of proof under Wilson vs. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 
3 6 2' 2 6 7 p. 2d 7 5 9 (19 5 4) • In Wilson, this Court held that the 
essential elements of a cause of action for alienation of affec-
tions are: 
(a) The fact of marriage; (b) that the defen-
dant wilfully and intentionally, (c) alienated 
the wife's affections, (d) resulting in the 
loss of the comfort, society and consortium 
of the wife, and (e) (to justify punitive 
damages) a charge of malice. 
Id., 267 P.2d at 763. 
In Wilson, however, this Court also approved two jury instru~ 
tions, the substance of which clearly indicated that: ( l) if 
plaintiff's own conduct, as opposed to the conduct of defendant, 
is the primary cause of the alienation of his spouse's affections 
for him, then plaintiff may not recover; and, (2) if the allegedly 
alienated spouse initiated the relationship between herself and 
defendant, or affirmatively sought his love and companionship, 
then defendant can not be found liable. Wilson vs. Oldroyd, l 
Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 768 (1954). 
It is an essential element of a cause of action for alienatior: 
of affections that plaintiff prove he and his spouse enjoyed tr~ 
love and affection prior to the time of defendant's alleged mis-
conduct. In Heist vs. Heist, 265 S.E.2d 434 (N.C. App. 1980), the 
court elaborated upon this requirement: 
In order to sustain a cause of action for 
alienation of affections, the plaintiff must 
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s l~ o " th c fol l ,:i-.1 in g Ea ct s : 
( 1) _:_~-,3 t she 2'.:d her hus~J<:ir1d were happily 
married and that a genuine love and affection 
ex is tecl be t"·:ee_r:i __ ~hem; 
(2) that the love and affection so existing 
was alienated and destroyed; 
(3) that the wrongful and malicious acts of 
defendant produced and brought about the loss 
and alienation of such love and affection. 
Warner vs. Torrence, 2 N.C. App. 384, 163 
S.E.2d 90 (1968). 
i!eist vs. Heist, 265 S.E.2d 434, 436 (N.C. App. 1980). 
Plaintiff must also demonstrate that defenda~t's conduct was 
active, willful and intentional. See, Stanton vs. Cox, 162 Miss. 
438, 139 So. 458, 460-461 (1932). The Supreme Court of Tennessee 
stated this requirement as follows: 
The weight of authority is that in alienation 
suits the plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant is the enticer--the active or 
aggressive party. If it develops that the 
plaintiff's spouse was merely bent on the 
gratification of lust, was not particular in 
the choice of a guilty partner, plaintiff's 
case is not made out. Likewise we think plain-
tiff's case would fail if it should appear 
that for any other reason the plaintiff's 
spouse was the pursuer rather than the pur-
sued. [Citations omitted.) 
Wilson vs. Bryant, 167 Tenn. 107, 113, 67 S.W.2d 133, 135 (1933). 
See ~~so Sadleir vs. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 29, 296 P.2d 278, 280 
(1956) (defendant's conduct must be the primary cause of the 
alleged alienation). 
With respect to what constitutes sufficient evidence of 
defendant's conduct to justify a finding that he wilfully and in-
tentionally alienated the affections of plaintiff's spouse, the 
Court of Appeals of New Mexico held as follows: 
The loss of the society, companionship, fellow-
ship, coifort, conjugal affections an~ support 
of the husband, when caused by any third person 
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maliciously invading the hallowed precincts of 
the home, and without justification severing 
the ties which bind the husband and wife to-
gether, from which a separation flows, is 
tortious, and the person who does so may be 
required to respond in damages. But the burden 
is upon the plaintiff to show that the opposite 
spouse did love and had affection for him or 
her, as the case may be, and that the defendant 
maliciously caused the alienation thereof by 
direct interference~--[Emphasis in original. J 
* * * 
[E)vidence of sexual intercourse between defendant 
and plaintiff'~ wife does not alone constitute 
proof that defendant was blameable [sic) or had 
the necessary willful intent •.• for imposition 
of liability in an action for alienation of 
affections. [Citation omitted.) The crucial 
issue is whether the defendant was the "aggressor." 
[Citation omitted.] 
Thompson vs. 'Chapman, 93 N.M. 356, 600 P.2d 302, 303-304 (Ct. App. 
(1979), cert. deniec:l_, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d 1078 (1979) (emphasis 
added). 
Finally, of those jurisdictions which retain alienation actioo• 
it appears to be the majority rule that plaintiff's conduct cannot 
be a cause of the alienation of his wife's affections. Annot., 
Element of Causation in Alienation of Affections Action, 19 A.L.R.2d 
471, 493 (1951), as supplemented, 1981; Comment, Piracy on the 
Matrimonial Seas--The Law and the Marital Interloper, 25 Sw. L. J. 
594, 604-605 (1971). 
Based upon Wilson and the authorities cited above, it is 
apparent that plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof in 
this case. The above analysis of the Kansas standard, many of the 
elements of which are recognized under Utah law, is equally appli-
cable here. Moreover, the above authorities yield two additional 
grounds in support of defendant's position that plaintiff failed 
to sustain his burden of proof at trial. 
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First, there i3 simply no evirlencc that pla1Dtiff and Brenda 
w· re happilv narrierl or that the; enjoyed a "genuine love and 
a•fection" prior to the time of any alleged conduct of defendant. 
It is undisputed that plainti[f, on frequent occasions, became up-
set with Brenda and telephoned her father "to come and get her." 
On at least one occasion, after becoming upset with her and after 
pushing her around, plaintiff told Brenda to leave their home. 
Linda Springer testified that plaintiff and Brenda had problems in 
their marriage long before they were introduced to defendant and 
Brenda herself testified that plaintiff had communicated to her in 
August or September of 1978 that he wanted a divorce. Plaintiff's 
conduct in continually "needling" Brenda and in repeatedly batter-
ing and abusing her completely belies his self-serving statement 
that he wanted his marriage to work "if possible." Finally, 
plaintiff's unequivocal statement, communicated during the heat of 
one of his many alcoholic rages, that he hated Brenda, was among 
the clearest and most convincing evidence of the nature of plain-
tiff and Brenda's reciprocal marital affections. In short, "[w]hat 
was in the store before it was burglarized at least sets a limit to 
what could have been burglarized." Alaimo vs. Schwanz, 56 Wis.2d 
198, 204, 201 N.W.2d 604, 607 (1972). 
Second, the evidence introduced at trial with respect to 
defendant's conduct does not clearly establish that he was the 
aggressor, the pursuer, or the active party in procuring the 
alienation of Brenda's former affections for her husband. In this 
regard, even assuming that the evidence presented by plaintiff 
regarding Brenda's sexual involvement with defendant is sufficient 
to support the trial court's finding of fact in this regard, never-
theless, evidence of sexual intercourse between defendant and 
Plaintiff's wife does not alone constitute proof "that defendant 
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i 
was blameable [sic) or had the necessary willful intent ... for 
imposition of liability in an action for alienation of affections.'· 
Thompson, 600 P.2d at 304. This proposition is especially true in 
the present case where both defendant and Brenda specifically 
denied any sexual misconduct during the time period in issue in 
this case, and where, as here, no other evidence of any kind of 
misconduct whatsoever was introduced at trial. 
Whether this Court adopts the Kansas standard or adheres to 
the standard of Wilson vs. Oldroyd, as supplemented by the authoriti{ 
cited above, plaintiff clearly failed to establish at trial a cauRI 
of action for alienation of affections. 
B. The Trial Court's Award Of Compensatory Damages Is Un-
supported By The Evidence, Excessive, And Was Based Upon Passion 
And Prejudice. 
In Roach vs. Keane, 73 Wis.2d 524, 243 N.W.2d 508 (1976), 
plaintiff brought an alienation action against defendant. The 
only evidence of damage introduced at trial was plaintiff's testi-
mony that he was "emotionally shocked and hurt by his wife's de-
fection." The jury awarded plaintiff compensatory damages in the 
amount of $17,500. After discussing its aversion and reluctance 
to interfere with jury damage awards, the Supreme Court of Wis~Mh 
concluded that 0 where the award reflects injuries not proved or a 
rate of compensation beyond reason, this court can find the damages 
excessive even in the absence of [fact finder] perversity." ~ 
vs. Keane, 73 Wis.2d 524, 243 N.W.2d 508, 517 (1976). 
The court in Roach noted that: 
the plaintiff demonstrated no pecuniary damage 
whatsoever; no evidence was introduced to show 
that he lost wages or incurred medical expenses, 
or that the divorce settlement resulted in 
additional financial burdens •.• Nor is there 
any evidence that he suffered any embarrassment, 
humiliation, or loss of social standing or 
-60-
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reputation as a result of che K~ane affair. 
The sole evidence of i~jur~ was his own 
testimony_ that he bad-i'icen- emotionally shocke'.l 
and hurt by his w1~c 's clefection. However, 0n 
aggregate awarcl of $17,500 in compensatory 
damages for his injurecl feelings reflects a 
"rate of compensation which is beyoGd reason" 
Id., 243 N.W.2d at 517 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of 
\lisconsin reduced plaintiff's compensatory daDages from $17,500 
to $500. 
There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record of the pre-
sent case which justifies the trial court's award of $59,600 in 
compensatory damages. Plaintiff demonstrated no pecuniary damage 
whatsoever. He did not introduce evidence to demonstrate that he 
lost wages or incurred medical expenses, or that his divorce settle-
ment with Brenda resulted in additional financial burdens. Plain-
tiff did introduce some evidence that his trucking job did not 
offer as much income as the first job he voluntarily quit. The 
trial court made no findings, however, that defendant's conduct had 
any impact whatsoever on plaintiff's voluntary termination from his 
first job. Moreover, it is undisputed that plaintiff was fired 
from his second job because of his own misconduct. 
Furthermore, plaintiff specifically told Brenda that he was 
quitting his first job because he did not enjoy working in a coal 
mine. Finally, plaintiff's mother testified at trial that, as of 
the date of trial, plaintiff had returned ~o work at his first job. 
Under these circumstances, plaintiff cannot rely upon his testimony 
that he earned less money as a truck driver than he did in the 
coal mine, to support the court's compensatory damage award of 
$59,600. 
Not only did plaintiff wholly fail to introduce any evidence 
of pecuniary damage, but he also failed to introduce any evidence 
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of embarrassment, humiliation, loss of social standing or reputa-
tion, or loss of the comfort, society and consortium of his wife. 
Indeed, plaintiff even failed to introduce evidence that he was 
emotionally hurt as a result of defendant and Brenda's conduct, the 
minimum quantum of evidence required in Roach to sustain the court's! 
reduction to $500 of plaintiff's jury verdict. To sustain the 
trial court's award of compensatory damages in the present case, 
I 
based upon plaintiff's meagre evidentiary showing, would constitute I 
a substantial perversion of the integrity of this State's judicial 
system. 
Even if the record in this case is deemed to contain evidence 
in support of the trial court's award of compensatory damages, such 
award was clearly excessive. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
recognized in Roach vs. Keane, 73 Wis.2d 524, 243 N.W.2d 508 (1976),1 
that the determination of a jury with respect to damages in an 
I 
alienation action should not lightly be disturbed. Notwithstanding• 
that recognition, the court in Roach concluded that when the rate 
of compensation is beyond reason, "this court can find the damages 
excessive even in the absence of [fact finder) perversity." Roach, 
243 N.W.2d at 517. 
In Wilson vs. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 326, 267 P.2d 759 (1954), 
after noting that in alienation litigation, "the amount of dam~Y 
must be determined largely upon the particular facts and circum-
stances of the individual case," this Court concluded: 
This does not mean that whenever one points his 
finger at another and accuses him of a real or 
fancied violation of his rights that a jury 
should be allowed to impose liability; nor, 
even that if a wrong has actually been committed, 
a jury must be given the privilege of dividing 
up the defendant's property with the plaintiff. 
It is and must be the responsibility of courts 
to determlne in the first instance whether there 
is a reasonable basis upon which a jury could 
determine that a legal wrong has been done to 
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pl~1ntiff which woul~ forra the basis of recovery; 
and l1kew1se to apply the general yardstick of 
"what reasonable men could find" to any damage 
a»1arded as compensation for an injury. If the 
verdict transgresses that limit so that it can 
properly be saicl-that_it_is so grossly excessive 
tha~ it must have been inspired by passion or 
preJudice, or by spite, envy, ill will or corrup 
t1on'. as contrasted with reason and justice, the 
verdict cannot be permitted to stand. 
267 P.2d at 764 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, this Court should be substantially less 
hesitant to modify the award of compensatory damages than the 
Court was in Wilson or than the Wisconsin Supreme Court was in 
Roach, because the lower court, not a jury, determined the amount 
of plaintiff's award. The value of preserving the American tradi-
tion of jury trials in civil cases will not be eroded by this 
Court's more careful scrutiny of the trial court's award of 
compensatory damages. 
In the present case, plaintiff's only evidence of damage at 
trial was the ultimate fact that Brenda is no longer his wife and 
the inference that she is no longer in a position to provide him 
with the benefits of consortium. Based upon the authorities cited 
above, it is axiomatic that defendant cannot be found liable for 
this "damage" to plaintiff if the latter's conduct was the proximate 
cause of the damage, or if Brenda voluntarily sought defendant's 
companionship and affections. Because the evidence clearly 
establishes that plaintiff's conduct was the primary proximate 
cause of the alienation of his wife's affections, and because the 
evidence clearly indicates that Brenda affirmatively and voluntarily 
sought defendant's companionship and affection, the trial court's 
compensatory damage award cannot stand. 
Moreover, it is axiomatic that defendant cannot be required 
to pay compensatory damages in excess of the value to plaintiff of 
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his and Brenda's reciprocal marital affections immediately prior to 
the time of defendant's alleged wrongful interference therewith. 
The present case clearly indicates that from a point in time early 
in their marriage, plaintiff and Brenda did not enjoy reciprocal 
love and affection. The trial court's award of compensatory damages, 
therefore, is excessive and cannot be supported. 
If this Court determines that consortium itself, no matter how 
unhappy and broken the marriage, is of some minimal, judicially 
cognizable value, then the trial court's award of compensatory 
damages could only be sustained if it were reduced by many thousa~s 
of dollars to reflect the other considerations referred to above. 
Such a determination, however, would appear to be substantially 
inconsistent with this Court's position in Tjas vs. Proctor, 591 
P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1979), that a husband may not recover for loss 
of consortium in the context of negligent injury to his wife. In 
view of all these considerations, it would appear that this Court 
should reduce the trial court's award of compensatory damages to 
an amount not greater than $500, the amount which appeared to ade-
quately compensate the plaintiff in Roach vs. Keane, 73 Wis.2d 524,. 
243 N.W.2d 508, 517 (1976). 
I 
Finally, it appears that the trial court's award of compensato1 
damages was motivated by passion and prejudice. In Wilson vs. 
Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 765 (1954), this Court not~ I 
that the indicia of passion and prejudice may be shown by "any-
thing affirmatively done or said by the judge or jury In 
the present case, the lower court's statements at the conclusionof 
trial indicate some degree of passion and/or prejudice. The court 
orally chastised defendant for stealing Brenda from plaintiff a~ 
for interfering wi t:h "the whole basic fabric of society." (T. 1241 
As noted above, however, the evidence clearly indicates that 
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d~fendant rlidn't steal Brenda, Brenda left plaintiff because he was 
an alcoholic and he abused and battered her. It almost goes with-
out saying that there is no evidence that defendant interfered with 
the whole basic fabric of society. 
But more importantly, the trial court's statement clearly 
indicates that the judgment he intended to award plaintiff against 
defendant was calculated to make defendant an example to the entire 
community that "if a case like this comes into my Court, that they 
can expect to suffer." (T. 124) It is axiomatic, however, that 
the purpose of an award of compensatory damages is not to make a 
public example of defendant nor to publicly condemn his conduct. 
The purpose of an award of compensatory damages, of course, is to 
compensate plaintiff. The days of the scarlet letter publicly 
displayed upon one's breast have long since slipped into the obscu-
rity of the past. Moreover, it would constitute an unacceptable 
and egregious windfall to award a plaintiff excessive compensatory 
damages, not based upon adequate proof at trial, simply because 
defendant's conduct was inconsistent with the trial court's per-
sonal predilections. 
In the present case, it is virtually impossible to determine 
whether the trial court's decision to publicly punish defendant and 
to condemn his conduct influenced only its finding with respect to 
punitive damages. In ~, this Court held that the amount of 
damages awarded by the fact finder is not, in and of itself, suffi-
cient evidence of passion or prejudice to justify reversal. Wilson 
vs. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 765 (1954). In the 
present case, however, it is not the amount of the compensatory 
damages which alone renders the trial court's award suspect, it is 
that amount coupled with the trial court's impassioned statements 
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and the total lack of evidence in the record to support the award 
which renders the same virtually unsustainable. In short, the 
obvious prejudice reflected in the lower court's post-trial state-
ments tainted not only its award of punitive damages, but also its 
award of compensatory damages. (See below. ) 
Because the trial court's award of compensatory damages in 
this case was unsupported by the evidence, excessive, and moti-
vated, at least in part, by passion and prejudice, this Court 
should modify the award. For the reasons stated above, a compen-
satory award in an amount not exceeding $500 would be both generou 
and reasonable. In the alternative, this Court should reverse t~ 
cause and remand the same for a new trial. 
C. The Trial Court's Award Of Punitive Damages Is Unsupported 
By The Evidence, Excessive, And Was Based Upon Improper Considera-
tions. 
This Court is free to liberally review and modify an award of 
punitive damages: 
Punitive damages are awarded on the theory that 
it is permissible in cases of certain aggravated 
wrongs to permit the private litigant, in the 
public interest, to impose a penalty upon the 
defendant as a punishment and to deter others 
from engaging in similar offenses. The reasons 
why the jury and the trial judge are particularly 
advantaged to fix compensatory damages are much 
less cogent here. For this reason we feel more 
at liberty to review and modify the award as to 
punitive damages. 
Wilson vs. Oldroyd, l Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 766 (1954) 
(emphasis added). 
There are three guidelines which this Court should apply in 
reviewing an award of punitive damages: 
[Punitive damages] have to fall within the limits 
of reason; "must not be so disproportionate to 
the injury and the actual damage as to plainly 
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manifest that they were the result of passion 
and preJudice" and must be correlated with the 
othc~ facts and circumstances shown in evidence 
including defendant's wealth. 
Id., 267 P. 2d at 766 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
In the context of alienation litigation, wiltul and intentional 
conduct on the part of defendant is not alone sufficient to justify 
an award of punitive damages. Punitive damages may only be awarded 
in alienation actions if plaintiff clearly and convincingly demon-
strates that defendant acted with malice. Wilson vs. Oldroyd, l 
Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 763, 766 (1954); see also, Elkington vs. 
Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41(Utah1980). 
Finally, an award of punitive damages may be reduced by this 
Court if the award of compensatory damages upon which the punitive 
damages are based appears to be "very substantial." In Wilson, for 
example, plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages in the amount 
of $50,000. The jury also awarded plaintiff punitive damages 
against defendant in the amount of $25,000. The facts in Wilson 
stronqly supported the award of punitive damages because substan-
tial evidence was introduced that plaintiff contacted defendant and 
literally "importuned him" to cease his "meretricious flirtations" 
with plaintiff's wife. Wilson, 267 P.2d at 762. Notwithstanding 
plaintiff's repeated importunings, defendant not only continued his 
relationship with plaintiff's wife, but also apparently increased 
its intensity. Under these circumstances, the jury awarded plain-
tiff punitive damages in the amount of $25,000. 
On appeal, this Court declined to remit plaintiff's award of 
compensatory damages. In view of the substantial amount of com-
pensatory damages awarded, however, the Court did reduce the amount 
of punitive damages from $25,000 to $5,000. Wilson, 267 P.2d at 
766. 
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Based upon the authorities cited above, this Court should 
vacate or remit the trial court's award of punitive damages for 
three independent reasons. First, there is no evidence in the 
record to support the trial court's award of punitive damages. In 
an alienation action, an award of punitive damages may not be sus-
tained on appeal in this State unless evidence of defendant's 
financial worth has been introduced in the trial court. In the 
present case, there is no evidence in the record which indicates 
defendant's financial worth. Punitive damages, of course, "are 
allowed as a punishment to the offender, and as a warning to him, 
and to others, not to engage in similar vexatious actions." Elking-
ton vs. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980) (footnote omitted). ~ 
award of punitive damages cannot properly serve the purpose of 
punishing defendant unless some evidence is introduced regarding 
defendant's financial worth. If no such evidence is introduced, 
the trial court risks either rendering defendant insolvent by 
awarding an amount he cannot possibly pay, or failing to achieve 
the underlying purpose of punitive damages by awarding an amount 
which cannot truly punish defendant. That such evidence was not 
introduced in this case, is sufficient reason alone to vacate the 
trial court's award of punitive damages. 
The trial court's award of punitive damages is not support~ 
by the evidence for yet another reason. There was simply no 
evidentiary showing in the trial court that defendant acted with 
malice in alienating Brenda's affections. First, the evidence 
clearly indicates that Brenda initiated the relationship between 
herself and defendant. Second, Brenda's conduct was a natural 
result of plaintiff's misconduct, including his alcoholism and 
history of battering and abusing her. Third, the evidence and it: 
reasonable inferences clearly indicate that defendant was merely; 
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\ 1 ictirn o~ ~ircu1~stances. The evidence indicates that Brenda sought 
the companionship, safety and affections of defendant. Brenda's 
conduct, of course, was motivated by plaintiff's abuses of her. 
2ven if defendant intentionally capitalized on the unfortunate 
circumstances of plaintiff and Brenda's marriage, such conduct 
alone would not justify a finding of malice. 
Furthermore, as Wilson clearly indicates, evidence of defen-
dant's intentional or willful conduct does not alone constitute 
malice sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages. Malice 
is defined as: "[t]he intentional doing of a wrongful act without 







circumstances that the law will imply an evil intent." Black's 
Law Dictionary 862, "Malice" (5th ed. 1979). There is simply no 
evidence in the present case that defendant harbored an intent, 
born of ill will or evil disposition vis-a-vis plaintiff, to 
alienate Brenda's affections. In short, plaintiff failed to demon-
strate sufficient circumstances of aggravation, in addition to 
defendant's alleged willfullness, to justify an award of punitive 
damages. See, Heist vs. Heist, 265 S.E.2d 434, 438 (N.C.App. 
1980). Plaintiff's failure to introduce sufficient evidence of 
malice justifies this Court's total vacation of the trial court's 
award of punitive damages. 
There is a second, independent reason which militates in favor 
of substantially remitting the lower court's award of punitive 
damages. In Wilson, the award of punitive damages bi the jury was 
en remitted from $25,000 to $5,000 because the jury's award of compen-
satory damages was "very substantial." Likewise, in the present 
case, the lower court's award of compensatory damages was "very 
substantial." As noted above, moreover, the award was also ex-
cessive and unsupported by the evidence. If this Court, however, 
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declines to reduce the lower court's award of compensatory ddm~ge 3 , 
nevertheless, because of the very substantial amount of compensa-
tory damages awarded by the trial court, this Court should measur-
ably reduce the amount of punitive damages awarded. Furthermore, 
because the facts of the present case are a "far cry" from the 
facts of Wilson, this Court should reduce the lower court's award 
of punitive damages substantially below the amount of punitive 
damages awarded in Wilson. 
Finally, this Court should vacate the trial court's award of 
punitive damages because the trial court's award appears to have 
been motivated by improper considerations. In Wilson, this Court 
indicated its willingness to liberally review and modify exemplary 
damage awards. Specifically, this Court may modify an award of 
punitive damages if it appears that such was the result of "passioo 
and/or prejudice." The trial court's post-trial s ta temen ts referred 
to above, clearly indicate that the trial court was motivated by a / 
desire to publicly punish defendant. Although, under other circum-
stances, that desire may constitute a proper basis for awarding I 
reasonable punitive damages, nevertheless, in the present case, t~ 
amount of punitive damages awarded by the trial court appears to 
have been predicated upon passion and prejudice. 
First, there was no evidence in the record below to support 
the amount of compensatory damages actually awarded. Secondly, 
there was no evidence in the record to sustain plaintiff's burden 
of proving that defendant acted out of malice. Finally, the loWN 
court stated, prior to its oral ruling on damages: "I don't knM 
how they're going to collect any money judgments that I give 
against you but they're certainly going to get one against you a~ 
I hope this gets well publicized • ( T. 124) It is doubtful 
that the collectibility of a civil judgment is a proper considera•f 
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in assess1n1 the a~ount ~f damages the court should award. More 
i,~;1ortantly, hov1ever, the trial court's statement clearly indicates 
that it was totally unaware, at the time it awarded plaintiff 
punitive damages against defendant, of the status of defendant's 
financial worth. The trial court had no idea whether its award 
-.1ould bankrupt defendant. It is not a proper purpose of punitive 
damages to bankrupt the defendant. Under all the circumstances, 
including the trial court's statements, it appears that the court's 
award of punitive damages was based upon improper considerations 
and was outside the bounds of the rule of reason. For this reason, 
the award should be vacated. 
Because the trial court's ultimate determination of liability 
was unsupported by substantial evidence, and because plaintiff 
wholly failed to sustain his burden of proof, the cause must be 
reversed. Failing that, defendant respectfully urges this Court 
to reduce the amount of compensatory and punitive damages awarded 
by the trial court. In the alternative, it should be reversed 
and remanded for a new trial to allow the trial court to receive 
sufficient evidence to facilitate the drafting of complete, compe-
tent findings of fact. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL CONSTITUTED A MANIFEST ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION. 
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (U.R.C.P.) 
provides in pertinent part: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any.of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, 
for any of the following causes[:] 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the 
court, jury or adverse party, or any or~er of 
the court, or abuse of discretion b~ which . 
either party was prevented from having a fair 
trial. 
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* * * 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary pru-
dence could not have guarded against. 
It is axiomatic that a motion for new trial under Rule 59 is 
directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial 
court's determination with respect thereto will not be reviewed on 
appeal except for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Paul vs. 
Kirkendall, 123 Utah 627, 261 P.2d 670 (1953); Uptown Appliance and. 
Radio Co. vs. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 P.2d 826 (1952); Crellin vs. 
Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952). The trial court, however, 
may neither capriciously grant nor arbitrarily deny a motion for a 
new trial. Crellin vs. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952). 
Justice in the American judicial system, in matters both 
criminal and civil, is predicated upon a foundation of procedural 
fairness. The most important components of procedural fairness a~ 1 
notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way. If fair 
procedures are not employed in civil litigation, and as a result 
justice fails, trial courts of this State have a duty to grant a 
new trial: 
Consistent with the purpose just discussed, when-
ever what has transpired in the proceeding i"SSO 
offensive to the trial court's sense of justice 
that he believes the desired objective of afford-
ing the parties a fair trial has failed, he has 
both the prerogative and the duty to grant a new 
trial. This court has always recognized that the 
trial court has a broad discretion in doing so, 
and that his ruling thereon should not be over-
turned unless it appears that his action was 
arbitrary, or that it clearly transgressed any 
reasonable bounds of discretion. 
Hyland vs. St. Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736, 738 
(1967) (emphasis added). See also King vs. Union Pacific R. co., 
117 Utah 40, 212 P.2d 692 (1949). 
In his motion for a new trial, defendant urged the lower cw 
to consider two aspects in which the proceedings employed by the 
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court and counsel in this case operated to deprive liim of pro-
c·2dural fairness. The lower court's failure to grant defendant a 
new trial based upon either of these two independent grounds 
i:herefor, constitute an abuse of discretion. 
A. Plaintiff's Failure To File Vii.th The c t d s our An erve Upon 
in Defendant A Notice To Appoint Another Attorney Or To Appear In 
Person Operated To Deprive The Trial Court Of Power To Proceed To 
~, Trial And To Deprive Defendant Of Due Process Of Law. 
1s. Utah Code Annotated §78-51-36 (1977) provides as follows: 
:ver, When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, 
or ceases to act as such, a party to an action or 
proceeding for whom he was acting as attorney 
must before any further proceedings are had 
), against him be required by the adverse party, by 
written notice, to appoint another attorney or to 
appear in person. 
(Emphasis added.) 
aR 1 This statute specifically provides that in the event a liti-
:air gant' s attorney is removed from the case or suspended from the 
138 
),/ 
practice of law, the opposing party, through counsel, must serve 
upon the unrepresented party written notice to either appoint 
ano.ther attorney or to enter his appearance pro se in the action. 
This section, however, is silent with respect to the consequences 
of the represented party's failure to serve this notice on the 
unrepresented party. 
Early case law interpreting the provisions of §78-51-36 adopted 
a restrictive view of the requirement that an attorney must have 
been "removed or suspended, or [ceased] to act as such." See, 
Van Cott vs. Wall, 53 Utah 282, 178 P. 42 (1919). Thus, the 
notice requirement of §78-51-36 was interpreted by this Court as 
binding only in those circumstances where the unrepresented party's 
former attorney died, became totally disabled, or ceased practicing 
~, as by disbarment or retirement from the profession. Van Cott 
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vs. Wall, 53 Utah 202, 178 P. 42, 45 (1919); Security Adjustment 
Bureau, Inc. vs. West, 20 Utah 2d 292, 437 P.2d 214, 215 (1968). 
This Court's most recent opinion with respect to §73-51-36, 
however, clearly indicates that the notice requirement of that 
section also applies in those instances in which the unrepresented 
party's attorney merely withdraws from the litigation. Utah Oil 
Co. vs. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1136 (Utah 1977). In Utah Oil Co., 
plaintiff's attorney had withdrawn from the action some time after 
an earlier pre-trial setting had been stricken. One of the defen-
dants filed the notice required by §78-51-36. Thereafter, no 
further proceedings were had for over a year. Eventually, defen-
dant moved the court for an involuntary dismissal based upon 
plaintiff's failure to appoint substitute counsel or to appear in 
the action pro se. The lower court granted defendant's motion, 
and plaintiff appealed. 
On appeal, after citing the provisions of §78-51-36, this 
Court made the following observations: 
The foregoing clearly appears to have been en-
acted to safeguard a litigant who finds himself 
without counsel and prevents further proceedings 
until he again has counsel or chooses to proceed 
pro se. 
Id., at 1136 (emphasis added). 
In short, when a litigant finds himself without counsel, for 
whatever reason, including the withdrawal of his former counsel, 
the opposing party must serve the notice required by §78-51-36 on 
the unrepresented party. Until such time as the unrepresented 
party has counsel or chooses to proceed pro se, the court is wi~ 
power to conduct further proceedings. This interpretation of §78· 
51-36 is consistent with Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice in the 
District and Circuit Courts: 
When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, 
written notice of the withdrawal must be served 
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upon the client of the ,1ithcJrawing attorney and 
u~on all other parties not in default and a 
C>'rtificate of service must be forthwith filed 
with the court. 
When an attorney dies or is removed or sus-
pended or withdraws fron the case or ceases to 
act as an attorney, the party ro an action for 
whom such attorney was acting, must hefore any 
furtt:er proceedings are had against him, be 
required by the adverse party, by written 
notice to appoint another attorney or to 
appear in person. 
(Emphasis added.) 
A careful reading of these authorities yields the following 
t~o inescapable conclusions: (1) the notice requirement of 
§78-51-36 is binding in those situations in which the unrepresented 
party's former counsel merely withdraws from the litigation; and, 
(2) upon service of said notice upon the unrepresented party, the 
court is powerless to proceed until the party upon whom the notice 
was served has been afforded a reasonable time to either appoint 
another attorney or to enter his appearance pro se. What consti-
tutes a reasonable time is not in issue on this appeal, because it 
is undisputed that plaintiff wholly failed to file the notice re-
quired by §78-51-36. As noted above, however, that section does 
not specify the consequences of a party's failure to file the 
appropriate notice. 
Utah Oil Co. clearly stands for the proposition that the 
purpose of §78-51-36 is to "safeguard" a litigant who finds himself 
without counsel. The prophlactic purpose of §78-51-36 would be 
entirely thwarted if the notice requirement thereof could be 
ignored with impunity. Thus, in order to effectuate the purpose 
which this section was designed to achieve, this Court should hold 
that a party who fails to comply with the requirements thereof may 
not initiate nor benefit from any further proceedings in the 
litigation in question if the unrepresented party would be unfairly 
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prejudiced thereby. Were the Court to adopt this position, defen-
dant would be entitled to reversal in this case because plain-
tiff initiated and benefited from further proceedings in this 
litigation, and defendant was unfairly prejudiced thereby. 
As the undisputed facts clearly disclose, defendant terminated 
his former attorney sometime in late July or early August of 1980. 
Thereafter, defendant's former attorney withdrew, but failed· to 
send copies of his withdrawal to defendant as required by Rule 2.5 
of the Rules of Practice. Plaintiff failed to serve upon defendant 
the notice required by §78-51-36 and Rule 2.5 of the Rules of 
Practice. No further proceedings were initiated by either party 
for a period of four months. On December 26, 1980, plaintiff 
petitioned the lower court to set aside its earlier order of dis-
missal. Within a period of less than 30 days, the action was 
reinstated, trial was conducted, and a judgment in excess of 
$84,000.00 was rendered in plaintiff's favor. 
If the appropriate notice required by §78-51-36 had been 
served upon defendant by plaintiff at the time of the withdrawal 1 
of defendant's former counsel, defendant would have been affo~~ 
four months to either retain new counsel or to prepare himself fm 
trial. If the appropriate notice had been filed on December 26, 
1 
1980, together with plaintiff's petition to reinstate, the tri~ 
court would have been powerless, based upon the authority of 
Utah Oil Co. vs. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977), to proceed~ 
hear plaintiff's petition on January 7, 1981 and conduct trial o: 
this matter on January 21, 1981. In short, if the required not~ 
had been filed on December 26, 1980, reinstatement on January 
and trial on January 21 would have been precipitous because 
defendant would not have been afforded a reasonable time to ap~ 1 
another attorney or to prepare to proceed pro se. 
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c·n· 1urllce to ck[enclunt in tl1e present case of the failure of 
1'1ai<tiff to fllf' the a,J;:n-opriat·2 w1tice, coupled with the precipi-
toa~ reinstatenent and trial of this matter, is completely at odds 
.. :it'~ the purpose of §78-51-36 and Justifies reversal. 
Moreover, plaintiff's failure to file the notice required by 
§78-51-36 operated to deprive defendant of due process of law. 
Due process of law in this State requires that the notice require-
ment of §78-51-36 be faithfully executed. In Worrall vs. Ogden 
City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980), plaintiff had been 
terminated as a fireman for the City of Ogden because of his re-
fusal to trim his handlebar mustache in accordance with "grooming 
standards" of the Ogden City Fire Department. The department chief 
in his letter of termination to plaintiff, failed to inform plain-
tiff that he was entitled to appeal his termination within five 
days to the Ogden City Civil Service Commission, as provided in 
U.C.A. §10-3-1012 (Supp. 1977). By the time plaintiff had contacted 
and retained counsel to aide him in protecting his rights, the 
five-day appeal time specified by statute had lapsed, and the Ogden 
City Civil Service Commission refused to review his discharge on 
the ground that the appeal was not timely filed. Plaintiff subse-
quently filed suit, but the trial court ruled that plaintiff's 
failure to file his appeal within the five-day limitaiton period 
specified by statute conclusively terminated his right to any 
further administrative or judicial review. The lower court also 
ruled that both the statute and the rules of the civil service 
commission constituted adequate notice to plaintiff of the five-
day limitation. 
On appeal to this Court, the plaintiff in Worrall contended 
that the procedures employed by the department chief in terminating 
him and in failing to specify in the termination letter plaintiff's 
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right to appeal the termination within five days, constituted not 
only a violation of the statute, but also operated to deprive plain-
tiff of due process cf law. The Court agreed. Worrall vs. Ogden 
City Fire Dept., 616 P. 2d 598, 600-601 (Utah 1980). The Court also 
noted that the notice required by due process of law is that noti~ 
which reasonably conveys the information required to inform the 
person notified of the pendency of the proceedings, the nature 
thereof, and of his right to appear and defend. Id. 
So fundamental is the importance of safeguarding the interes~ 
of a temporarily unrepresented litigant that failure to do so by 
serving upon him the notice required by §78-51-36, constitutes a 
manifest denial of due process of law. The advantage of insuring 
that each party to civil litigation enjoys fundamental fairness 
must be balanced against the disadvantage or inconvenience, if 
any, to the opposing party of the procedures designed to guarantee 
that fairness. By its enactment of §78-51-36, the Utah Legislature 
has determined that the requirement that opposing counsel serve 
notice upon a temporarily unrepresented litigant to appoint a new , 
attorney or to appear pro se, is not unduly inconvenient. In 
short, the benefit not only to the unrepresented litigant, but ~ 
the system as a whole, substantially outweighs the inconvenience 
accruing to the party required to serve the notice. Because the 
benefit itself is fundamental fairness and because fundamental 
I 
fairness is the very heart of due process of law, this Court shoulri · 
hold that a party's failure to serve the notice required by §78-Sl·ll 
constitutes a denial of due process of law to the party upon wh~ 
the notice should have been served. 
Such a holding would be consistent with Worrall. The minor 
inconvenience of including an additlonal sentence in a letter of 
termination, which informed the terminated employee of his five-
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l~; Qppeal right, WQS held inconseyuential in Worrall, in view of 
the nverwhel~inJ advant~Je of affording the terminated employee 
notice of his right to appeal. Fundamental fairness demanded 
nothing less. In the present case, the inconvenience of serving 
the appropriate notice required by §78-51-36 on an unrepresented 
litigant is insignificant. The basic protection of that litigant's 
rights afforded by such notice is overwhelming. It is a denial of 
due process, therefore, if such notice is not served as required 
by statute. The lower court's failure to grant defendant's motion 
for a new trial on this ground alone, constituted an abuse of 
discretion. 
B. Defendant Was Not Afforded Adequate And Timely Notice Of 
Trial And As A Result, Was Denied An Opportunity To Be Heard In A 
Meaningful Way. 
The lower court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial 
constituted an abuse of discretion for a second, independent reason: 
defendant was not afforded timely notice of trial, as required by 
due process. The inevitable results of untimely notice, of course, 
are the denial of an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way 
and the erosion of fundamental fairness. 
Due process of law is not a technical concept and cannot be 
stated in terms of a rigid formula or mathematical equation; •[r]ather 
the demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness 
of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and 
just to the parties involved." Rupp vs. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 
338, 341 (Utah 1980). 
The most essential elements of due process of law are timely 
notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard in a meaningful 
way. See, Worrall'vs. Ogden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598, 601 
(Utah 1980). The notice requirement of due process is fundamental: 
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As a matter of due process, parties whose rights 
are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and 
in order that they may enjoy that right they must 
first be notified. Consequently, notice is an 
essential element of due process. This is 
especially true in proceedings of a judicial 
nature affecting the property rights of citi 
zens. 
16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law §827 (1979) (footnotes omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
To satisfy the requirements of due process, notice must be 
afforded which, under the particular circumstances of the case, 
would allow the litigant to prepare for a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard: 
To meet the requirements of due process, the 
notice must be reasonable and adequate for the 
purpose, due regard being had to the nature 
of the proceedings and the character of the 
rights which may be affected by it. The notice 
which is an elementary and fundamental require-
ment of due process in any proceeding is notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the circum-
stances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections. In 
other words, it must give sufficient notice of 
the pendency of the action or proceeding and a 
reasonable opportunity to a defendant to appear 
and assert his rights before a tribunal legally 
constituted to adJudicate such rights. The 
notice must be of such a nature as reasonably 
to convey the required information, and it must 
afford a reasonable time for those interested 
to make their appearance; but if, with due re-
gard for the practicalities and peculiarities 
of a case, these conditions are reasonably met, 
the constitutional requirements are satisfied. 
16A Am.Jur. 2d 1017-1018 Constitutional Law §829 (1979) (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added). See also, Worrall vs. Ogden City Fire 
Dept., 616 P.2d 598, 600-601 (Utah 1980). 9 
9
Not every deprivation of fundamental fairness, timely notic" 
or a reasonable opportunity to be heard constitutes a violation 
of due process. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, 
specifically provide that a liberty or property interest must be 
at stake. Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment also provides thal 
deprivations of these interests must result from state action tJ 
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In the pr~scnt case, the trial court's findings of fact are 
_1!,stantially inco1,1plete an;l unsupp0rt2d by the evidence with 
cr:''P'"ct to the issue of adequate and timely notice. For example, 
th,: court did not find as fact the elate: upon •.1hich defendant re-
ceived actual notice of the trial setting. The record reveals 
that plaintiff's petition for reinstatement was dated Friday, 
December 26, 1980. The petition was apparently mailed to the 
court and was received and filed on Monday, December 29, 1980. 
The lower court failed to find as fact the date upon which defen-
dant received a copy of the petition, but the reasonable inference 
is that defendant received a copy of the same on Monday, December 
29, 1980. 
A hearing on plaintiff's petition was conducted on January 7, 
1981, less than ten days from the date defendant received a copy 
of plaintiff's petition. At the time of the hearing, the court 
apparently granted plaintiff's petition to reinstate and specifi-
cally set the matter "for hearing." There are three different 
references in the record and transcript to the fact that the court 
did not set the matter "for trial," but set the same "for hearing." 
First, at the time plaintiff's petition was called up for hearing 
constitute a violation of due process of law. As a matter of con-
stitutional law, whenever a defendant in a civil action is in 
jeopardy of being compelled to pay a civil judgment rendered in 
plaintiff's favor, a property interest protected by due process 
is sufficiently at stake to justify certain minimum procedural 
protections. Moreover, a defendant's liberty interest in privacy, 
especially in the area of consensual sexual activities, is always 
at stake in an alienation of affections action, and such interest 
is entitled to due process protection. See, Griswold vs. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt vs. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
Finally, the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is met in those circumstances where officers of the court, including 
attorneys or clerks, or the machinery of the judicial process itself, 
is called upon to enforce the rights of private litigants. Shelley 
vs. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
-81-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and defendant was present in the courtroom, the court specifically 
granted plaintiff's petition and set the matter for hearing. It 
is undisputed that defendant left the courtroom following the court', 
granting of the petition. Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel inquir~ 
of the court whether or not the matter had been set. The court re-
sponded again that the matter had been set for hearing. Finally, 
the clerk's minute entry also reveals that the court set the matter 
"for hearing." It is also significant that the court instructed 
the clerk to contact defendant and inform him that the matter had 
been set for hearing. 
In its findings of fact, to which defendant strenuously objected 
the court found that, on January 7, 1981, it set "the trial in the 
instant matter for January 21, 1981." R. 78, finding of fact 13. 
There is no evidence in the record or transcript to indicate, however 
that the court objectively manifested its intent to set the matter 
for trial. All of the objective manifestations of the court's 
intent clearly indicated that the matter was set "for hearing." It 
is axiomatic, of course, that, although this Court gives great 
deference to the findings of fact of the trial court, nevertheless, 
the findings must be detailed and must be supported by substanti~ 
evidence. Hidden Meadows Development Co. vs. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, ' 
1250 (Utah 1979); Rucker vs. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338-1339 
(Utah 1979). No evidence supports finding of fact #3. All the 
evidence clearly indicates that the court set the matter not for 
trial, but for hearing. Although an attorney may have interpret~ 
the court's determination to set the matter "for hearing" as, in 
fact, a trial setting, defendant was not an attorney. As a laymar., 
defendant did not understand, as of January 7, 1921, that the 
hearing to which the court referred was a trial on the merits. 
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1t~e onl:1 c:vic1Pncr" in the~ ti:ansci:ipt oi: record \lhich indicates the 
cla te uron 1·it, ich defendant received actual notice of trial setting, 
clParly ciemonstrates t~at defendant first became aware of the trial 
settina en January 19, 1981, bai:ely two days before trial. 
As noted above, the lower court instructed the clerk to inform 
defendant that the matter had been set for hearing. The lower 
court found as fact that the trial court executive did, in fact, 
telephone defendant. R. 79, finding of fact #8. Defendant objected 
to findina of fact ~8 because it was incomplete and misleading. 
~ost importantly, this finding failed to indicate the date upon 
which that telephone conversation was conducted. The only evidence 
before the trial court on defendant's motion for a new trial was 
that the telephone conversation in fact took place on January 19, 
1981, after defendant first received notice of trial setting. 
R. 52, 84. 
Thus, although the trial court's findings are incomplete and 
misleading on this issue, nevertheless, the only evidence pre-
sented thereon was that defendant received actual notice of trial 
for the first time on January 19, 1981. That date is the date 
upon which he received the court's notice of trial setting and the 
date upon which the telephone conversation was conducted between 
the trial court executive and defendant. 
The ti:ial court also found that defendant made no objection 
to the January 21, 1981 trial setting. R. 79, finding of fact #6. 
Moreover, the court found as fact that defendant did not request 
a continuance and did not inform the court that he was unprepared 
to proceed at the time of trial. The record does not indicate that 
defendant was advised by anvone--the court, the trial executive, 
the clerk, or plaintiff's counsel--that he had a right to object to 
the · h t he had a right to move the court for a trial sett1no or t a 
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continuance. Defendant is an unsophisticated layman and was not 
versed in the nuances of civil procedure. Moreover, defendant r~ 
ceived actual notice of trial setting only two days before the 
trial was scheduled to commence. Unc'1er all the circumstances, it 
would have been totally uDreasonable to have expected defendant ~ 
object when he did not understand his right to do so or to move the 
court for a continuance when he did not understand how to do so, 
especially where trial was but two days away from the date he 
received notice thereof. 
The lower court also found as fact that the court "cautioned 
the defendant at the commencement of the trial, but defendant 
indicated his readiness to proceed without counsel." R. 79, find-
ing of fact #13. There is no evidence whatsoever in the transcript 
that the court cautioned defendant, at any point during the entiu 
proceedings, about the hazards of proceeding without counsel. Tu 
the contrary, as the transcript clearly indicates, the court's c~ 
versation with defendant at the commencement of trial was abbrevi· 
ated and terse. In fact, the court interrupted defendant twice in 
the middle of a sentence and ordered the parties to proceed with 
their cases. See Tr. 5-6. Finding of fact #17 is closely related 
to finding of fact #13. In the former finding, the court purport~ 1 
to find that additional notice to defendant to obtain counsel would' 
have served no useful purpose because defendant made his decisi~ 
to represent himself "notwithstanding cautions from the trial c~ 
executive and from the court itself." R. 80. As previously noteci, 
however, the court simply did not caution defendant concerning 
self-representation. Moreover, defendant in his post-trial affi· 
davit indicated that the trial court executive did not caution 
defendant about the hazards of proceeding without counsel. R. 8,~, 
In her own affidavit, the trial court executive did not indi~~ 
-84-
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t~2t she cautioned defen~ant conc0rnino self-representation. R. 64. 
finally, the trial court fot'nc as fact that clefem1ant indicated 
he was prepared and ready to rroceed at trial without counsel. The 
record indicates that defendant did, in fact, advise the court that 
he was prepared to proceed. Defendant's statements, however, 
should not be inflexibly or riqidly construed. First, it is a 
matter of common knowledge to members of the bench and bar of this 
State that the modern complexities of the judicial system virtually 
incapacitate the untrained and unskilled from proceeding to act as 
their own counsel in complex civil litiqation. No layman possesses 
the knowledge or ability to represent himself in a civil trial. 
With this realization in mind, the federal courts have adopted a 
general policy designed to liberally protect the rights of pro se 
litigants. See, e.~., Hemphill vs. Melton, 551 F.2d 589 (4th Cir. 
1977) (complaints of pro se plaintiffs more broadly and liberally 
interpreted); Finley vs. Staton, 542 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(complaints of pro se plaintiffs liberally interpreted and con-
in 
I strued); Holmes vs. Goldin, 615 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1980) (pro~ ,,, 
plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to "fairly and freely" ~ 
.ed 
amend his complaint). 
Second, defendant's statement that he was prepared to proceed 
should be interpreted in the context of the length of the time he 
had to prepare. Defendant received actual notice of trial on 
January 19, 1981. Because he had not been advised of his right to 
object to that setting or his riqht to move for a continuance, 
defendant believed he had no choice but to prepare for trial. Few 
attorneys, if any, could have prepared this kind of case for trial 
in two days. Many attorneys could not have prepared defendant's 
case in the two weeks from January 7, 1981, the date of the 
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"setting," to January 21, 1981, the date of trial. Nevertheless, 
under the compulsion of the circumstances, defendant "prepared" 
his case to the best of his ability. Thus, defendant's statement 
at the commencement of trial thct he was "prepared," must be inte~ 
preted to mean that, given the fact he was afforded only two days 
notice and that he was an unsophisticated layman, he had done the 
best he could to ready himself for trial. 
The foregoing analysis clearly indicates that defendant was 
denied due process of law because he was not afforded timely and 
adequate notice of trial. Notice was untimely because defendant 
was given but two days to prepare for trial. If defendant is 
deemed to have had notice of trial on January 7, 1981, then the 
notice was inadequate because defendant was only informed that he 
was to prepare for a "hearing." That the trial court proceeded in 
such an unduly expeditious fashion to grant plaintiff's petition 
for reinstatement, set the trial, and conduct the same within a 
period of two weeks, only compounded the denial of defendant's 
right to procedural fairness. That the lower court failed to 
inform defendant of his right to object or his right to a contin~ 
ance, constituted the final erosion of defendant's due process of 
law rights. Moreover, this Court should adopt the position espousei 
by the federal courts that even in civil litigation, the trial 
court has some minimum responsibility to protect the due process 
rights of a pro se litigant, especially where, as here, a litigant's 
pro se status is coerced by what may be misconduct on the part of 
his former attorney and by the failure of the opposing party to 
provide the minimum notice required by §78-51-36. For these reasons 
the cause should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
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COI!CLliSICI! 
For the reasons stated in Point I above, this Court should 
,olish actions for alienation of affections in this jurisdiction. 
In the alternative, the Court should reverse the trial court be-
cause plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof. Further, 
in the alternative, the Court should reverse the cause and remand 
for a new trial because defendant was denied due process of law and 
because plaintiff failed to file and serve upon defendant the 
notice required by due rrocess and by n.C.A. §7£-51-36 (1953) and 
Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice in the District and Circuit 
Courts of the State of Utah. Only as a last resort should the 
Court reverse the cause and remand for a new trial to allow the 
lower court to receive sufficient evidence to facilitate the 
drafting of more complete, consistent and supportable findings of 
fact. As an additional alternative, this Court should reduce the 
amounts awarded as compensatory and punitive damages to conform 
11ith the law and the evidence. 
DATED this j]tC.._ day of July' 1981. 
CHAIG M. SNYDER, for: 
HOl•:AHD, LEIHS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mniled two (2) true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant to Mr. 
K. L. Mc!ff, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, 151 North 
Main Street, Richfield, Utah 84701, postage prepaid, this~ 
day of July, 1981. 
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c 
K. L. MCIFF 
JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
151 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 896-5441 
0 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRETT W. NELSON, 




Civil No. 7928 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court for trial 
this 21st day of January, A.O. 1981, and the parties being 
\ 
present and having stated their readiness to proceed, and the 
Court having heard the evidence adduced and being fully 
advised in the premises, 
NOW FINDS AND ORDERS as follows, to-wit: 
FINDINGS 
1. tt all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was 
the husband of one Brenda Nelson, now Brenda Jacobson, having 
\, 
married her on or about July 15, 1978. 
2. That the Defendant did wrongfully interfer 
with the said marriage and did willfully, intentionally and 
maliciously alienate the affection of Brenda Nelson for her 
husband, Brett Nelson. 
3. That over a course of several months, Defendant 
had numerous and sundry contacts and rendezvous with the 
Plaintiff's wife without the knowledge of Plaintiff, and 
while Plaintiff was at work. 
4. That the Oe~endant had sexual ~elations with 
Plaintiff's wife on at least ~ix· occasions while Plainti'ff's 
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5. That the marriage relationship is ~acred and 
the contracting parties thereto are entitled to all of the 
benefits of such contract and such relationship free from the 
willful interference by other persons. 
6. That each spouse in a marital relationship is 
entitled to the benefits of consortium, including not only 
the material services, but love, felicity, companionship, the 
exchange of ideas, and the maintenance of an intimacy abounding 
in reciprocal acts of kindness. 
7. That Defendant's willful interference in 
Plaintiff's marriage caused Plaintiff to loose the benefits 
to be derived from marriage as heretofore set forth, and has 
further caused Plaintiff significant mental anquish, distress 
and suffering. 
8. That in due course, Plaintiff's marriage 
terminated, and that the tortious interference by Defendant 
was fully consumated by Defendant's marriage to Plaintiff's 
former wife, Brenda Nelson. 
9. That Plaintiff has established a sound basis 
for the award of damages for loss of consortium both past and 
future, mental anguish both past and future, and punitive 
damages. 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant 
as follows: 
1. For loss of consortium, the sum of $600.00 per 
month for a period of sixteen months beginning in June of 
1979, for a total of $9,600.00. 
2. For future loss of consortium and for mental 
.<A I)~ /.fa ..._, ...... 
anguish, the sum of~lf,000.00. l • / '..I 
3. 
4. 
For punitive damages, the sum of ~,000.00. 
The total judgment of $84,6000.00 shall bear 
interest at the rate of eight (8%) percent per annum from and 
after the date hereof until fully satisfied. 
J, 
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BRETT W. NELSON VS. JEFF JACOBSEN 
Civil No. 7928 
Findings and Judgment (Cont.) 
~'~'''}(~~~ 
-="<'' \. ~\\. L!. -~ 1 {""'"~'!.. ~s}:~E'o)r,11isr--.JC...L-­
f.:;;;/o//7,_~);~ , :'. 
~~!Otl':J·~ ..:f'' \\ \:.;;: ~!:":l {re~ .S>; , \·::-· ~~I~: ~' ~~ l1\ ~ v/': )~~ 
~ & X .·--·~' oJ 
YI •C.• '. li._.~ 'v. ,:: (t~,Sj~~ Np t:. ",-;;r.f' AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
t,,,~ l 0 c\\ Vr.'" •\\\'''~'~~reby certify that a full, true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT was placed 
in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-
class postage thereon fully prepaid on the ~ day of 
January, 1981, addressed as follows: 
125 
Mr. Jeff Jacobson 
1425 South State 
Salina, Utah 84654 
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IN TiiE DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 




NO. 21,,,ir CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned Clerk of the District Court of the Ccunty cf San~e~. 
State c:f Utah do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the 
judgment rendered in the a~ve entitled acticn 1 
and recorded in Judgment Record r of aaid ccurt, at page/..( .5-/ .:z fl-/,(~ 
AND I further certify that the for~going papers hereto annexed cr:ns-.g-;;;_;-~ -
Judgment P.c>ll in said action. 
WITNESS my hand and seal 
day of l\~kµi:l-!'--1:J 
" /" 
C>.:;_,_L 
of said court hereto set en +,.h:.s ________ _ 
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K. L. McIFF 
JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
151 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 896-5441 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRETT W. NELSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL AND FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
JEFF JACOBSEN, 
Civil No. 7928 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court this 4th 
day of March, A.D. 1981 on the Plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and 
counsel having submitted their briefs in support of their 
respective positions, together with supporting affidavits and 
transcripts, and having appeared and argued the matter, and 
the Court being fully advised in the premises, now enters the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law, to-wit: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On January 7, 1981 the instant matter came 
before the Court on the Plaintiff's petition for reinstatement 
and for trial setting. 
2. January 7, 1981 was the Court's term opening, 
at which time it sets trials in all matters which are at 
issue before the Court. 
3. That Defendant was present in person at the 
. ....... nA~~" . .1-h (A~f' ,.,.,o 
term opening on January 7, 1981 at which time the Court~et 
the trial in the instant matter for January 21, 1981. 
4. That on January 14, 1981, the Court signed a 
written order reinstating the instant action and setting it 
for trial on January 21, 1981. 
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5. That the written order of reinstatement and 
trial setting was mailed to Defendant on January 15, 1981. 
6. That the instant matter had been ~~nding for 
well over a year's time, and had been before the Court at 
each of its terms openings, as well as other occassions, and 
had been set for trial and continued on prior occassions, and 
no objection was made by the Defendant to the trial setting 
for January 21, 1981. 
7. That in addition to the formal order signed by 
the Court, notice of the trial setting was sent to the Defen-
dant by the Clerk of the Court. 
8. In addition, the trial court's executive 
telephoned the Defendant advising him of the trial setting 
and advising him that he should retain counsel, that Plaintiff 
was represented by competent counsel, and that Defendant 
should employ counsel. 
9. That in the said telephone conversation between 
Defendant and the trial court executive, the Defendant advised 
the trial court executive that he had determined to represent 
himself at the upcoming trial. 
10. That Defendant had originally been represented 
by one David Brown, Attorney at Law, of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and that between the January 7, 1981 date and January 21, 
1981 when the trial was held, Defendant contacted another 
attorney, one Rulon Don Brown, with whom he reviewed every-
261 
thing. 
ll. That at no time did the Defendant appear 
before the Court and request a continuance or advise the 
Court that he was not prepared to proceed. 
12. That Defendant appeared before the Court at 
the time and place set for trial and advised the Court that 
he was prepared to represent himself. 
13. That the court cautioned the Defendant at the 
commencement of the trial, but Defendant indicated his readi-
ness to proceed without counsel. 
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14. That Defendant came to the trial with his 
witnesses, that he called and examined the same, cross-
examined Plaintiff's witnesses, and argued his case. 
15. That subsequent to the trial, and in the form 
of affidavits, Defendant has alleged certain facts relating 
to his relationship with his former attorney David P. Brown, 
which facts were not known to the Court before the trial, and 
Defendant should pursue such remedy in relation thereto as he 
deems appropriate. 
16. That Defendant was aware that his relationship 
with his original attorney had been terminated, that the 
matter was going forward, and that he was either obliged to 
obtain other counsel or represent himself, and he made a 
conscious decision to do the latter. 
17. That an additional notice from Plaintiff to 
Defendant to obtain counsel would have served no useful 
purpose, Defendant having made his decision to represent 
himself notwithstanding cautions from the trial court executive 
and from the Court itself. 
18. That the trial setting, as well as proceeding 
with the trial, was consistent with the orderly handling of 
the Court's trial calendar, and the Court was unaware of any 
reason that it should not proceed with trial. 
19. That it would be unjust to impose on Plaintiff 
the necessity of a new trial for a problem which Defendant 
claims arose between him and his attorney, and which was not 
made known to Plaintiff or to the court until after the 
trial. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Trial on the matter was set consistent with 
the Court's usual practices and consistent with procedural 
fairness and due process. 
2. The Defendant received timely notice of the 
trial and was given a reasonable opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful way. 
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3. The Defendant has a right to represent himself. 
4. Under the facts as heretofore found, there is 
no legal basis for Defendant's claim that he was denied 
procedural fairness or due process of law. 
5. The burden of a problem belatedly alleged to 
exist between Defendant and his former counsel should not 
rest upon Plaintiff. 
6. Otah recognizes a cause of action for alienation 
of affection, including an award for loss of consortium, the 
law being properly stated in Wilson vs, Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 
362, 267 P2d 759 (1954), and being distinguishable from 
rulings in Black vs. United States, 263 F.Supp. 470 (D. Utah 
1967) and Tjas vs. Proctor, 591 P2d 438 (Utah 1979); the 
latter dealing with negligence claims. 
It is the Court's opinion that the basic premise on 
which one marital partner is precluded from a separate recovery 
for loss of consortium where the other marital partner suffers 
from a negligent injury is that such damages are included in 
the direct recovery of the injured marital partner. That is 
to say that whatever is denied to the one is included in the 
recovery of the other. such reasoning is wholly inapplicable 
to alienation of affection cases; there being no recovery for 
the marital party whose affections have been alienated, and 
the end product of the alienation being divorce. The injured 
party has no remedy except direct action against the inten-
tional tort-feasor. 
It is further the Court's opinion that the right of 
privacy, including privacy relating to sexual matters, as 
construed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Griswold vs. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) do not extend 
to confer on one man the right to become sexually involved 
with the wife of another man free from any concern or inter-
ference by the state. 
The court is of the opinion that the marriage 
covenant and contract should be afforded the protection of 
263 
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the l~w and that the rights of the respective marital partners 
therein are paramount and take precedent over an interloper's 
right of privacy in sexual matters which threaten the integrity 
of that marriage covenant and contract. 
7. Defendant has failed to establish a sound 
basis for the granting of a new trial. 
8. The Defendant has failed to establish a sound 
basis for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
9. With respect to the findings and judgment 
heretofore entered, numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8 are properly 
findings of fact and are hereby designated as such; findings 
5, 6, and 9 are conclusions of law and are hereby designated 
as such. 
is reaffirmed. 
AND FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT was placed in 
the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class 
postage thereon fully prepaid on the 
1981, addressed as follows: 
day of March, 
Mr. Craig M. Snyder 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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OBJECTIONS TO ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
AND FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
Civil No. 7928 
14 COMES NOW Jeff Jacobsen, through his attorney, Craig M. Snyder 
15 and submits the following objections to the Court's Order Denying 
16 Motion for New Trial and for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
17 l. The Court's Finding of Fact t3 states that defendant was 
18 present in person on January 7, 1981 "at which time the Court set 
19 the trial in the instant matter for January 21, 1981." The Court 
20 did not, in fact, •set the trial" in this matter on January 7, 
21 1981. The transcript of the January 7, 1981 "setting" clearly 
22 discloses that the Court did not in open court set the matter for 
23 trial, but rather scheduled it.•for hearing on January 21, 1981, 
24 at 10:00 a.m., following the Law and Motion matters." The affi-
25 davit of defendant clearly indicates that on January 7, 1981, 
26 after the Court set this case "for hearing,• defendant immediately 
27 left the courtroom. The subsequent interchange between the Court 
28 and Hr. Mciff, some 20 minutes after the Court set the matter "for 
29 hearing,• was conducted outside the presence of defendant. Thus, 
30 even if the Court had clarified that the "hearing" it had referred 
31 to in its earlier Order from the bench meant a full-blown trial, 
32 defendant was not present during such interchange and, therefore, 
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1 could not have understood that by "hearing" the Court meant a full-
2 blown trial. Even the subsequent interchange between the Court and 
3 Mr. Mciff, however, fails to specifically indicate that the Court 
4 was setting the matter, not for hearing, but for trial. 
5 Therefore, defendant objects to Finding of Fact #3 upon the 
6 ground that the Court did not, on January 7, 1981, set this case 
7 nfor trial.• 
8 2. Defendant objects to Finding of Fact 15 upon the ground 
9 that said finding is irrelevant and misleading. That finding 
~O states that a written order of reinstatement and trial setting 
11 •was mailed to defendant on January 15, 1981." The uncontradicted 
12 affidavit of defendant, presented to the Court at the time of the 
13 March 4, 1981 hearing on defendant's post-trial motions, clearly 
14 indicates that defendant received the Court's order of reinstate-
15 ment and trial setting on January 19, 1981. The date upon which 
16 the trial setting was mailed is completely irrelevant and mislead-
17 ing on the issue of timely notice of trial setting. As indicated 
18 in the previous objection, defendant believed that the case had 
19 been set "for hearing• when he left the courtroom on January 7, 
20 1981. Defendant had no notice that the "hearing• to which the 
21 Court referred on January 7, 1981, was in fact a full-blown trial. 
22 Defendant first received notice of the trial setting on January 19, 
23 1981. That the notice of trial setting was mailed on January 15, 
24 1981, is wholly irrelevant and misleading because the key issue is 
25 not when the notice was mailed, but when defendant received actual 
26 notice of trial setting. As indicated previously, defendant did 
27 not receive actual notice until January 19, 1981, two days before 
28 trial. 
29 3. Defendant objects to the Court's Finding of Fact 17 on 
30 the ground that said finding is incomplete and substantially mis-
31 leading. That finding provides that •notice of the trial setting 
32 was sent to the defendant by the Clerk of the Court.• The finding 
-2- -Yl-
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l does not indicate the date upon which the notice therein referred 
2 to was received by defendant. The issue presented to the Court in 
3 defendant's post-trial motions was whether or not defendant had 
4 received actual notice of trial in a timely manner. Finding of 
5 Fact t7 does not specifically address the issue of when defendant 
6 received actual notice of trial. Moreover, evidence at the hearing 
7 on defendant's post-trial motions clearly indicated that said 
8 notice was sent first to David Brown, defendant's former counsel. 
9 Finally, as indicated above, defendant's uncontradicted affidavit 
~O clearly indicates that he did not receive the notice of trial 
11 setting referred to in Finding of Fact t7 until January 19, 1981. 
12 The fact that notice was sent and the fact that it was mailed on 
13 January 15, 1981 are wholly irrevelant with respect to the issues 
14 of when defendant received actual notice and whether or not such 
15 actual notice was timely. 
16 4. Defendant objects to the Court's Finding of Fact tB. Said 
17 finding indicates that the trial court executive telephoned defen-
18 dant advising him of the trial setting and advising him that he 
19 should retain counsel. The finding is incomplete because it does 
20 not indicate the date upon which said telephone conversation was 
21 conducted. More importantly, however, as defendant's attached 
22 affidavit indicates, it was defendant who contacted the trial court 





having received the notice of trial setting ref erred to above and 
for the first time having realized that a trial, not a hearing, was 
scheduled for January 21, 1981, contacted the trial court executive 
to confirm that he (defendant) was expected to proceed with a full-





conducted on January 19, 1981, two,days before trial. 
5. Defendant objects toe the Court's Finding of Fact 110 on 
the ground that said finding is erroneous and unsubstantiated by 
any evidence presented a~ the March 4, 1981 hearing on defendant's 
-3-
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l post-trial motions. Said finding states that •between the January 
2 7, 1981 date and January 21, 1981 when the trial was held, defen-
3 dant contacted another attorney, one Rulon Don Brown, with whom he 
4 reviewed everything." The attached affidavit of defendant clearly 
5 indicates that the conversation between defendant and R. Don Brown, 
6 referred to in Finding of Fact flO, did not take place between 
7 January 7, 1981 and January 21, 1981. Said conversation took 
8 place substantially before January 7, 1981, was informal, and in 
9 no event constituted a complete review of •everything,• as expli-
~O citedly stated in said finding. In fact, as defendant's affidavit 
11 clearly indicates, defendant did not even have a copy of his file 
12 at the time of his conversation with R. Don Brown. Of course, 
13 therefore, defendant and R. Don Brown could not have discussed in 
14 any detail the procedural or substantive aspects of the case. 
15 Therefore, the finding as prepared is wholly unsubstantiated and 
16 completely erroneous. 
17 6. Defendant objects to the Court's Findings of Fact tll, 112 
18 and #13 on the grounds that they are unsubstantiated misleading. 
19 Finding of Fact ill provides that defendant did not appear before 
20 the Court and request a _continuance or advise the Court that he was 
21 not prepared to proceed. Said finding is misleading for two reason 
22 First, the uncontradicted evidence indicates that defendant is not 
23 and was not, at all times relevant to this proceeding, versed in 
24 civil procedure. In short, defendant had no idea that he had a 
25 right to a continuance or a right to advise the Court that he was 
26 not prepared to proceed. Thus, Finding of Fact tll is misleading 
27 because it implies that defendant understood civil procedure to the 
28 extent that he waived a known right by failing to request-a continu 
29 ance or to inform the Court that he was unprepared to proceed. 
30 Second, Finding of Fact tll is misleading because it fails to 
31 disclose that defendant had a substantial reason for not advising 
32 the court he was unprepared to proceed. Defendant knew that the 
-4- -f'I 
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2 
Court was to hear the evidence and felt that if he were to advise 
the Court he was unprepared to proceed, such admission of unpre-
3 paration might seriously prejudice his case on the merits. Because 
4 of his unfamiliarity with procedure, therefore, defendant considere 
5 it ill-advised to inform the Court that he was unprepared. 
6 Defendant objects to Finding of Fact tl2 for the same reasons 
7 cited as objections to Finding tll above. 
e With respect to Finding of Fact 113, defendant objects on the 
9 ground that the transcript of trial indicates that the Court did 





indicates that the Court asked the defendant whether or not he was 
represented, advised the defendant that it would hear the evidence 
and make appropriate rulings based thereon, and advised defendant 
that he had a right to represent himself. But at no point prior 
to the trial did the Court caution defendant about the hazards of 
proceeding EE:?_ ~· Therefore, Finding of Fact 113 is not supported 
by any evidence whatsoever. 
7. Defendant objects to Finding of Fact 115 on the ground 
that said finding is wholly irrelevant and unnecessary to dispose 
of the issues prosecuted at the March 4, 1981 hearing. 
21 8. Defendant ohjects to Findings of Fact tl6 and tl7 upon 
22 the grounds that they are unsubstantiated and make no reference to 
23 Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice in the District and Circuit 
24 Courts of the State of Utah and Utah Code Annotated S78-51-36 
25 (1953). Finding of Fact tl6 states that defendant knew "the 
26 
27 
matter was going forward" and "that he [defendant] was either 
obliged to obtain other counsel or represent himself, and he made 





that additional notice from plaintiff to defendant to obtain coun-
sel "would have served no useful purpose• because defendant chose 
to proceed EE:?_ ~· "notwithstanding cautions from the trial court 
executive and from the Court itself.• 
-s-
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l These findings are unsubstantiated and misleading for three 
2 reasons. 
3 First, as noted above, there was no evidence to indicate that 
4 either the trial court executive or the Court itself •cautioned" 
5 defendant about proceeding without counsel. To the contrary, 
6 neither the Court nor the trial court executive warned defendant 
7 of the hazards of proceeding without counsel or in any other manner 
8 •cautioned" him. 
9 Second, no evidence was presented at the March 4, 1981 hearing 
~O to substantiate the finding that further notice •would have served 
11 no useful purpose.• To the contrary, the evidence clearly indi-
12 cated that, as of January 7, 1981, defendant believed he was to 
13 prepare for a "hearing,• and defendant received no formal notice 
14 of a full-blown trial until January 19, 1981. Had defendant been 
15 afforded the requisite notice to appoint counsel, as provided by 
16 Utah law, at the most logical point in the proceedings, i.e. 
17 December 26, 1980 (the date upon which plaintiff petitioned the 
18 Court to set aside its earlier order of dismissal), although 
19 defendant would have been afforded less than a month to prepare 
20 for trial, nevertheless, he would have had at least three additiona 
21 weeks to prepare his presentation. 
22 Third, Findings tl6 and tl7 wholly ignore defendant's primary 
23 argument in support of his motion for a new trial, namely, that 
24 plaintiff's failure to comply with U.C.A. S78-51-36 and Rule 2.5 
25 of the Rules of Practice was prejudicial and operated to deny 
26 defendant his constitutional, due process rights. For purposes of 
27 appeal, a finding should be made that plaintiff failed to comply 
28 with Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice and S78-Sl-36 and that the 
29 court determines that such failure was not in the least prejudicial 
30 Plaintiff's failures to comply with the state statute and court 
31 rule are virtually beyond dispute. Defendant objects to the Court' 
32 implied finding, however, that such failures were not prejudicial, 
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l on the grounds that said implied finding is unsubstantiated. 
2 Therefore, defendant .obj,ects to Findings U6 and il 7 accordingly, 
3 9. Defendant objects to Finding of Fact tl9 on the ground 
4 that said finding is unsupported by the evidence. First, no evi-
5 dence was presented at the March 4, 1981 hearing on defendant's 
6 post-trial motions to support the proposition that plaintiff would 
7 be prejudiced were the Court to grant defendant a new trial in 
B this matter. Second, plaintiff's argument of prejudice is wholly 
9 without force in view of plaintiff's own failure to comply with 
~O §78-51-36 and Rule 2.5. In other words, if plaintiff had "clean 
ll hands" and had properly discharged his burden under state law, as 
12 provided in §78-51-36, plaintiff might then have a more persuasive 







new trial. In the present case, however, plaintiff refused and 
failed to comply with state law, has •unclean hands," and there-
fore, is in no position to argue prejudice when, in fact, plaintiff s 
failure to notify defendant to appoint counsel significantly pre-
judiced defendant at the original trial of this matter. Finding 
of Fact tl9, therefore, is objectionable. 
20 For the reasons stated above, defendant objects to the Court's 









and redraft its findings in accordance with the evidence and with 
the analysis presented herein. 
Respectfully submitted this -Zr./K..da~ of March, 1981. 
CRAIG M. SNYDER, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
30 MAILING CERTIFICATE 
31 I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
32 the above and foregoing Objections to Mr. K. L. Mciff, Attorney 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l for Plaintiff, 151 North Main Street, Richfield, Utah 84701, 
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K. L. McIFF 
JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
151 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 896-5441 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRETT W. NELSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMENDMENT TO FINDINGS 
OF FACT 
JEFF JACOBSEN, 
Civil No. 7928 
Defendant. 
The Court having considered the objections of the 
Defendant to the findings made by the Court in its Order 
Denying Motion for a New Trial and for Judgment Notwith-
standing the Verdict, and having further considered the 
Plaintiff's response thereto, now orders as follows, to-wit: 
Finding of Fact Number 10 on page 2 is amended to 
read as follows: 
10. That Defendant had originally been represented 
by one David Brown, Attorney at Law," of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and that subsequent to the termination of that employment and 
prior to the trial on the merits, Defendant contacted another 
attorney, one Rulon Don Brown, with whom he reviewed every-
thing, and following which Defendant made a decision to 
i:_e~se~~V>imself in the action. f 1:::<··~~{__1}~~~~\ this _.l::;;t......-'"""l'-=~1 
'· ~~ 
'· ··-,~ -- ;·f{ 
~· •,: -, ,' ·,/ /t;f' \?{~\a~1~i=~~~!by c::::::v:a:F a ~:::~G true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing AMENDMENT TO FINDINGS OF FACT was 
315 
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placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah with 
first-class postage thereon fully prei:-aid on the __L$[__ day of 
April, 1981, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Craig M. Snyder 
120 East 300 North 
P. 0. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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JACKSON HOWARD, for: 
HOV'/ARD. LEWIS 6 PETERSEN 
ATJ"ORNEY8 AND C:OUNSELOR8 AT LAW 
120 EAn 300 "°'"'" SrMrr 
P'. o. aoz 778 
P'ROVO. UTAH 84.ol 
~· 37>--&S411 
Attorney> forc..-.:De=fo.:e:..:n.:;d:.;a:.;n=t _____ _ 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRETT W. NELSON, 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT 
vs. 
JEFF JACOBSEN, Civil No. 7928 
Defendant. 
13 - - - - - - - - -
14 STATE OF UTAH 
15 COUNTY OF UTAH 
:ss. 
16 I, JEFF JACOBSEN, after being first duly sworn, depose and 
17 say: 
18 1. I am the defendant in the above-entitled action. 
19 2. am a person with limited education. I have had no 
20 prior business experience and I am not acquainted with lawyers 
21 or how they charge. I have never been a plaintiff or a defendant 
22 in a legal action before this case. 
23 3. When I was served with the Complaint in this matter, I 
24 asked a friend what to do and he recommended to me Mr. David P. 
25 Brown, an attorney in Salt Lake City. I subsequently contacted 
26 Mr. Brown to represent me and at that time I paid to Mr. Brown a 
27 retainer of $500. There is attached hereto and made a part hereof 
28 a copy of the check covering that ret.ainer. 
29 4. After I had retained Mr. Brown to represent me, he re-
30 quested that bring in an additional $6,500, which he would hold 
31 in his trust fund. He would use that trust fund to negotiate a 
32 settlement with Mr. Nelson's attorney, pay any additional attor-
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ney's fees that were incurred, and refund the balance to me. 
5. In approximately August or September of 1980, Mr. Brown 
notified me that he had been able to negotiate a settlement of 
this case for the amount of $5,000, and he requested that I send 
$5,000 to his office to cover the amount of the settlement. I 
asked him why he just did not take the $5,000 out of the $7,000 
that was being held in the trust account and he replied that 
charges for his legal services had used up the entire amount of 
the $7,000 and that I would have to send more money in order for 
him to be able to try the case. When I protested, he stated 
that if I would write a letter discharging him, he would refund 
$1,300 out of the money in the trust account to me and that 
could approach the plaintiff directly and attempt to settle the 
case by giving him a promissory note for $5,000 or negotiating 
my own settlement • ' \ 
Since I did not have an additional $5,000 to provide Mr. 
Brown, Mr. Brown indicated that he would not represent me without 
receiving additional attorney's fees to cover the costs of trial. 
6. ~ told Mr. Brown that I would send him the letter dis-
charging him and asked him to send me copies of all of the corres-
pondence and pleadings and his notes which were contained in my 
file. also requested that he send me copies of my deposition 
and the deposition of the plaintiff, Brett W. Nelson, which 
were taken in the case. Mr. Brown sent me the $1,300 but did not 
deliver any portion of his file, nor did he give me any instruc-
tions concerning what might occur if he were to withdraw as coun-
sel. 
7. on January 19, 1981, I received a letter in the mail 
from the Clerk of the Court saying that the case was to be tried 
on January 21, 1981. I appeared at the trial, but was unprepared 
and incapable of representing myself. The case was tried, I did 
not have counsel and there is attached hereto a copy of the judg-
ment. 
-2-
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l. 8. I received no notice from Mr. K. L. Mclff notifying me 
2 to obtain new counsel prior to the trial date and no copy of Mr. 
3 Brown's notice of withdrawal was sent to me. 
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MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. K. L. Mclff, Attorney 
for Plaintiff, 151 North Main Street, Richfield, Utah 84701, this 
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14 STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
15 COUNTY OF SEVIER ) 
STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFF 
JACOBSEN 
Civil No. 7928 
16 I, JEFF JACOBSEN, having been first duly sworn, depose and 
17 state as follows: 
18 1. On January 7, 1981, I was present in the Sanpete County 
·19 Courthouse in Manti, Utah, for approximately 20 minutes • 
. 20 2. During my brief presence there, I heard the Honorable Don 
21 v. Tibbs call up the case of Nelson vs. Jacobsen, in which I am 
22 the defendant. Counsel for the plaintiff, Mr. K. L. Mciff, was 
23 not present at that time. 
24 3. I heard the Honorable Don v. Tibbs state that he intended 
25 to set the case for a hearing on January 21, 1981, at 10:00 a.m. 
26 4. After stating the date and time for the hearing on my 
27 case, the Court immediately proceeded to address other cases, and 
28 thought that my further attendance in court was unnecessary. 
29 5. As a result, I left the courtroom immediately. 
30 6. From January 7, 1981 to January 21, 1981, I did not con-
31 tact any attorney regarding my case. 
32 ///// 
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1 7. Substantially prior to January 7, 1981, I had an informal 
2 conversation with Mr. R. Don Brown regarding the merits of my de-
3 fense in plaintiff Brett Nelson's action against me. At the time 
4 of my conversation with Mr. R. Don Brown, my former attorney, 
5 David Brown, failed and refused to provide me with copies of the 
6 relevant documents and materials from my file in his possession, 
7 and therefore, Mr. R. Don Brown and I could not conduct our conver-
8 sation with reference to any specific material or documents in-
9 valved in this case. 
10 8. On January 19, 1981, I received a notice from the Court 
11 which informed me that I would have to be prepared to go to trial 
12 on this case on January 21, 1981. This notice was the first indi-
13 cation I had that I was required to prepare for a trial rather 
14 than a hearing on this case. 
15 9. Partly as a result of my confusion, I called the trial 
16 court executive to determine if I, in fact, was required to prepare 
17 for a trial rather than a hearing. The trial court executive 
18 advised me that trial was, in fact, scheduled for January 21, 1981. 
19 The trial court executive asked me if I had an attorney, to which 
20 question I replied that I did not. At no time did she caution me 
21 about the hazards or difficulties of proceeding without counsel. 
22 10. In fact, at no point during the course of these proceed-
23 ings was I ever informed of the hazards of proceeding without 
24 counsel. Moreover, I never received any notice from plaintiff 
25 that I was required to appoint counsel after David Brown had 
26 ceased acting as my attorney, and at no point in these proceedings 
27 was I ever informed that if I needed more time, or otherwise re-
28 quested a continuance, the Court would grant the same and would 
29 allow me more time and a complete opportunity to prepare for 
30 trial. 
31 11. have never had any training whatsoever in the law in 
32 general, or courtroom procedures in particular .. 
-2- -T'l-
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DATED this :2¢) day of March, 1981. 
;-----JE'Fi'/dACOBSEN 
I -- ' t,' 
\_/ ~-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ,~->-day of March, 
NOTARY JiUBL7i"e 
J.l. My Commission Expires: Residing at: 
l.2 
l.3 





", ~~ 17 MAILING CERTIFICATE 
_, z '. g~ 18 I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
;~ 0 ~ 19 the above and foregoing Affidavit to Mr. K. L. Mc!ff, Attorney 
:z: ~ 
20 for Plaintiff, 151 North Main Street, Richfield, Utah 84701, 
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RECEIVED 
JUq - 1981 
HOWARD LEWIS & PETERSEN 
K. L. McIFF 
JACKSON, MCIFF & MOWER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
151 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 896-5441 
SO:VIER COU.'ilY 
R:cE1vrn r:o. YJ 5b 
1579 r;ov -1 PM 2 52 
DEVON POULSON. CLE~K 
BY ~J:MrOEPUTY 
0'.~ 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRETT W. NELSON, 
Plaintiff, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. 
Civil No. 8256 
BRENDA LEE NELSON, 
Defendant. 
-..\. 
This cause came on regularly for hearing on the ~.L \)~<I\,~\./ , 1979, before the Court sitting without a day of 
jury, The Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Judge, 
presiding. It satisfactorily appearing to the Court that good 
cause had been shown for waiving the 90-day waiting period of 
time between the filing of the complaint and the hearing of the 
action as provided by Section 30-3-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
it further appearing that Defendant made, executed and signed 
a certain Stipulation, General Appearance, Waiver and Consent 
filed herein, in and by which she entered her voluntary and general 
appearance in this action, subjected herself to the jurisdiction 
of the Court, agreed to receipt of a copy of the complaint, waived 
her right and time to contest said action, to answer or otherwise 
plead to the Complaint, and no additional time having been 
granted her in which to answer or otherwise plead to the complaint, 
and the Plaintiff and his counsel, K. L. Mciff, of Jackson, Mciff 
and Mower, appearing in person, and the Defendant not appearing 
in person or by counsel, and the Court having heard the evidence 
offered by the Plaintiff duly admitted herein in support of his 
MATTSSON. JACKSON & MCIFF 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
RICHFIEl...D, UTAH 114701 
w 53S-
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complaint, and being fully advised in the premises, and having 
filed herein its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore 
existing between the Plaintiff, Brett w. Nelson, and the Defen-
dant, Brenda Lee Nelson, be and the same hereby are wholly dis-
solved and the parties freed from the obligations thereof. 
2. Neither party is awarded alimony or child support. 
3. Each party is awarded such property as each had 
prior to contracting the marriage. 
4. Each party is awarded such property as each now 
has in his or her respective name and particularly plaintiff is 
awarded whatever interest the parties have in the certain parcel 
of property standing in the name of Brett W. Nelson and William 
B. Nelson located in Salina, Utah and described as follows, 
to-wit: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 3, 
Block 8, Plat A, Salina City Survey, Thence 
South 127.5 feet, Thence West 214.S feet to 
the West line of lot, Thence North 127.5 feet, 
Thence East 214.5 feet to point of beginning. 
Containing 0.57 acres. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded a certain motorcycle and 
snowmobile and a certain horse, and the parties otherwise are 
awarded their own personal effects, belongings and paraphernalia. 
6. The parties are ordered to execute such instrwnent 
of conveyance, assignment or transfer as may be required to give 
force and effect to the terms of the preceeding paragraph. 
7. Each party is ordered to pay any debts or obliga-
tions which he or she has incurred. Plaintiff is ordered to 
satisfy current utility bills. 
8. Defendant is restored to her maiden name of Brenda 
Lee Winn, there being no children born as issue of the marriage 
and no reason for Defendant to retain Plaintiff's surname. 
W5~6 
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I -3-9. Each party is ordered to pay his own court costs 
and attorney's fees incurred by him or her in the instant pro-
ceedings. 
10. The Court hereby approves that certain Stipulation 
executed and acknowledged by the parties on or about the 25th 
day of September, 1979. 
11. This Decree is and shall be an interlocutory 
decree and.shall not became final until three months from the 
date of filing. ~ . 




~~!~ ~f s~~~~ } • 
I, D• Von Poul10n, Oerl in end fw the County of S.vfep. 
H ••-Officio Clerk or the DiJtrid Court of .... Sirlh J1,1dicial 
Di1trid in and for Se¥ier County. St1te of Ut1h, do hel'tlby 
certify fhet the foNgoing i1 e fuU, tn..e end col"Nef copy 
of tho o•;g;"J.N~L- "/ .,,0.-~ 
~~BS -.......... ~------~OGE 
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~tntt of jlrunbn l ss. No. B 2 8 4 0 41 C!Countp of C!Clnrlt, j 
'lrbis is to ClCertlfp tbat tbt unbersigneb __ 'J._~0--'-"'="•_...'l'""'-. _:.D_ .. _,,{¥ _______ _ 
bib on tfJt 74-t bnp of Oc.tabe.Jt. ©:.ID. 19_8_0 ____ _ 
~1-L:....i ~ ~ (/44,µJ_ ZM ~ ~ ~ s;.'41. ~ 'V.,.u. 8910. nt ··--·--7 ___ jleunba 
(Addrtiss 01 Church) 
join in la tuf ul ~ t bl oclt _____ ..J.J£!..Jsfi4f4"R-!>-sY'l---!3IlfNNtt-1G L6Jl.~H>i.N-H-D~JJ-Al\rt.Cl-liOB~S>iee-lll-N-----
of AXTELL ~tatt of UTAH 
anb1 ___________ ---"B~R=EN=D=A~L=E=E'--'-'-'WI~N=N___; _______ _ 
of. _______ N:.c..:E---'P_:_ll.:_I ----~tntr of ___ ___;U:c..;.T-'A-'-H ____ _ 
witb tfJeir mutu,1l ron!>rnt, in tfJr presence ot_m_-t._"c.h._a_e_l_H_a--'4 P._e.« ______ _ 
Wl)O Wll6 ll WitllCl313. 
Aecordod in Book or Marridges, 
Clark County Nevada Rocords, Joon L. Swift Aocordar 
Date ..... P. 9.$J98Q. . 
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